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I N T R O D U C T I O J 
Tne pa te rn i ty of a child i s a b io logica l fac t and i t 
does mean that the paterni ty of a man l i e in a man who (bigotten) 
fathered him, so paterni ty i s a question of f a c t , on the other 
hand legitimacy means that a child i s born of a legal ly recognised 
union and if the child is born of an i l l i c i t union or as a resu l t 
of casual act of intercourse the child would be t reated as i l l e g i -
Is 
t i m a t e . When the legitimacy of a child/proved the paterni ty of 
t h a t chi ld/automat ical ly/proved. But a l l proved pa t e rn i t i e s are 
not l eg i t imac ies . 
By proof of paterni ty means, f i r s t l y proving the b io lo-
g i c a l fa ther of the child, and secondly, a l l the biological 
f a the r s of a child are not the fa the r s of that child in law. 
For example, if A i s born to his mother B, the mother conceived 
by Mr. C and B and C are not husband and wife in law than the A 
is the son of C in biology, but not in law, or C is the fa ther 
of A in biology but not in law. 
Here in law legitimacy i s more important than paterni ty 
because a l l l ega l consequences i . e . maintenance, inheri tance and 
custody r i g h t s e t c . of the child are bound by his legitimacy and 
and not by his p a t e r n i t y . The evidence of pa te rn i ty i s a very 
-;2 
important evidence in the proceedings of legit imacy. 
In order to define the concept of pa te rn i ty in a legal 
system the at tempts have been made to c r i t i c a l l y analyse the 
concept r e l a t i n g to legitimacy and r e l a t ions between the two, 
i . e . pa tern i ty and legit imacy. A detai led discussion of the 
legitimacy wi l l give r i s e / a c l ea r picture of paterni ty a l so . 
In order to b r ing the c l a r i t y in the concept of pa te rn i ty , 
legitimacy i s simultaneously discussed. 
I t i s not easy to define legitimacy as an abstract 
concept without reference to pa r t i cu la r l ega l system. Never-
the l e s s most systems of law have drawn a d i s t i n c t i o n between 
the legal pos i t ion of a child born of legal ly recognised union 
or a casual act of sexual in t e rcourse . 
The common law rule i s tha t a child is legit imate if 
h is parents lawfully married e i t h e r at the time of his concep-
t i on or a t the time of the c h i l d ' s b i r t h . In English Law as a 
matter of social policy law leans heavily in favour of l e g i t i -
macy of chi ldren, born during the subsistance of legal marriage. 
Nevertheless while i t is unjust and unconscionable to 
f o i s t pa terni ty and i t s attendant r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s on a man 
who by a l l reasons could not have been the fa ther of the chi ld . 
Hence, while the law should fu l ly protect and safeguard l e g i t i -
macy, i t should also allow proof of fac ts which render paterni ty 
3 
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highly improbabla in a p a r t i c u l a r case. 
Muslim Law has i t a own rules r e l a t ing to the legitimacy, 
parentage and acknowledgement of paterni ty and differs from the 
other legal systems in t h i s r e spec t . 
In Muslim Law parentage i s establ ished e i t he r -
i ) By b i r th during a regular (also irregula;i: not void) 
marriage, or 
i i ) By acknowledgement 
I t must be noted tha t western system of legi t imat ion has 
no place and recognit ion under th is system. Acknowledgement of 
pa t e rn i t y i s quite d i f fe ren t from the doctr ine of leg i t imat ion . 
Legitimacy i s a s t a t u s which r e s u l t s from cer ta in 
f a c t s , l eg i t imat ion is a proceeding which creates a s t a t u s , 
which did not ex is t before . In the proper sense there is no 
l eg i t ima t ion under Islamic Law. On the other hand the Evidence 
Act has recognized the western concept of legi t imat ion . Section 
112 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872, raised a legal presumption 
of legit imacy applicable to the off-spring of a l l married 
couples in India. I t laid down tha t a child would be deemed to 
be legi t imate if i t was born, 
i ) e i t h e r 'during the continuance of a val id marriage' 
between i t s parents , or 
1. V.N. Nageshwara Rao, Conclusive Proof of Legitimacy U/s 112, 
Evidence Act, V. 94 Cr .L.J . 1988, p.36 
2 . Habibur Rehman v . Altaf Ali (1921) 48 I.A. 114. 
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i i ) within 280 days af ter i t s d iasolu t ion the mother 
remaining unmarried. 
The fac t of a c h i l d ' s bir th in e i t h e r of these two 
circumstances would, according to the Section be a conclusive 
proof of i t s legit imacy, unless i t could be shown tha t the 
persons s ta ted to be i t s parents never has ' access ' to each 
other at a time when i t 'could have been b i g o t t e n ' . The legal 
presumption raised by the Section had the effect of 
the burden of proving the i l legi t imacy of a child sa t i s fy ing 
on the person in te res ted in making i t out . The presumptions 
i s never a f i n a l t r u t h , they are prone to r e b u t t a l s . The 
presumption of legitimacy largely depends upon the presumed 
f ac t that the p a r t i e s to a marriage have necessary access to 
each o ther . That is why the presumption i s allowed to be over-
thrown by proving that the re was no access of husband and to 
h i s wife a t about the time when the child could have been 
4 b i g o t t e n . 
as 
The word ' a cces s ' can be explained/ an indicia of oppor-
tun i ty for marital intercourse.-^ An ' a c c e s s ' and 'non-access ' 
6 
oannote existence and non-existence for mari ta l in tercourao. 
3 . Tahir Mahmood, [Presumption of Legitimacy under Bvidenoo Act, 
A Century of Action and Reaction,' 79 Special 
Issue, 1973. 
4 . 5a.i Bangi v . Deputy Director Oonsolidation. AIR 1982 All.335 
5 . F i e l d ' s Law of Evidence, 1972, p . 4617. 
6 . Venkataswaralu v. Venkata Uarayan, AIR 1953 SC 176 
The demand of j u s t i ce and t ru th i s that the fa ther of a child in 
law sha l l "be the same v/ho i s the "biological fa ther of tha t child, 
The presumptions are never f i n a l t ruth so every presumption 
howsoever strong i t may lie rebutted by any other more convincirg 
and d i rec t evidence so the presumption of legitimacy and pa t e r -
ni ty can v a l i d l y be rebutted or corroborated by the modern 
s c i e n t i f i c techniques spec ia l ly those techniques which are being 
developed as branches of science i . e . pathology, forensic and 
g e n e t i c s . These developments can very well be used and u t i l ized 
to find out more spec i f ic and r e l i a b l e conclusion. The consider-
able advance in the science of blood grouping has provided the 
cour t s of law an improved means of proof of spec ia l value where 
the question of pa t e rn i ty arise» I t i s for the l eg i s l a tu re and 
the courts to f i t and u t i l i z e such evidence in to the exist ing 
l ega l framework. 
Barbara E. Dodd in his paper "The Scope of Blood Grouping 
in the e lucidat ion of Problems of Patern i ty" describes the 
s c i e n t i f i c aspect of pa te rn i ty t e s t i n g in terms, understandable 
by those who are neither s c i e n t i s t nor blood group apeoia l i s t s 
and he had p a r t i c u l a r l y in mind the legal p r a c t i t i o n e r . 
S c i e n t i f i c a l l y , f a ther i s the person whose sperm has 
f e r t i l i z e d ovum of c h i l d ' s mother. During f e r t i l i z a t i o n both 
f a the r and mother contr ibutes 23 chromosomes each. The 
chromosomes carry genes on them, which are responsible for 
heredi tary t r a i t s . So far maternity i s concerned, i t can be 
proved by proof of de l ivery . Sc ien t i f i c p r inc ip l e s are made 
use of mainly in disputed p a t e r n i t y . I t i s an invariable 
p r inc ip l e of human biology that blood of a child must inher i t 
i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s from e i t h e r of the pa r en t s . 
If blood of a child const i tuents which are neither 
avai lable in the husband nor in the wife, pa t e rn i ty of the 
7 
husband becomes doubtful. Blood groups can be used as aid 
in the e luc ida t ion of problems of doubtful pa te rn i ty because 
they are charac ters which obey Mandelian Laws of inher i tance . 
Moreover, they can be invest igated by means of a c lear-cut 
object ive t e s t s . 
8 
Prof. Chandrasekaran of Disputed Pa te rn i ty Centre, 
Madras, said "we t e s t about ten systems". The deciding fac tor 
was the S.L.A. typing of blood group. The population could be 
divided in to 300 mil l ion groups and if a l l these testa were 
conducted, i t almost reaches ind iv idua l i sa t ion of blood. In 
these ins tances , he said, "we can say cent per cent whether a 
P a r t i c u l a r child i s not a child of X and Y, but we can say that 
99.9 per cent that the child is born t o a person. Referring to 
the Disputed Maternity case of Mary, Prof. Chandrasekaran stated 
tha t eight persona in a l l were tes ted and they were the Mary and 
7. Vidya Sagar, Presumption of Legitimacy, 1986(3) SSC 11. 
8. C.S. Jayaram, The Hindustan Times, 4th June, 1989. 
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other family members of "both s ide . We, then found that the 
f i r s t couple was not the b io logica l parents and the l a t t e r 
Perumal and Kaliammal were 99.9 per cent the r ea l pa ren t s . 
The a r r iva l of DNA finger p r in t ing pa r t i cu l a r ly as 
developed by Alec Jefferys and colleagues at Leicester Univer-
s i t y i s a big step towards a forensic s c i e n t i s t s goal in th is 
a rea i . e . pin-point ing the r ea l parents in the disputed 
pa te rn i ty case. This technique has the p o t e n t i a l to exceed 
the eff iciency of conventional systems (blood group tes t 
system) because there are good grounds for an t i c ipa t ing that 
de f in i t e answers not only those , excluding pa te rn i ty but also 
for .pin-pointing the true f a the r , w i l l be obtained in every 
case . 
The gene is the uni te of inher i tance . Genes are made 
of deoxir ibo-nuclic acid (DM). DM. polimers are differen-
t i ab le not on the basis of physical or chemical propert ies of 
molecular s i z e , geomatry or subs t i tuents groups, but ra ther 
by difference in information contents ( i . e . genet ic code). 
The genet ic imprint is a bas i s of criminal inves t igat ions 
and in solving disputed questions of pa t e rn i ty . 
The most problematic f ie ld of the determination of pater-
n i t y comes when the concerned p a r t i e s decline the i r consent for 
blood t e s t . In the absence of any l eg i s l a t i on on the subject, 
the courts have to look into the s t ray s t a t u t e s to find out the 
9 . Sarla R. Gupta, 'Pool Proof T e s t ' , Lex ET J u r i s , V.3 
July 1988, p . 50 
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base to order for compulsory blood t e s t . Lacking l eg i s l a t ion 
the cour ts had not found i t easy to f i t such blood t e s t evidence 
into the l ega l frame-work and the process of doing so was cont i -
nued t i l l 1969. The chronology of Judic ia l pronouncements is 
r e f l e c t i n g a systematic p ic ture that how the law developed in 
England by the courts in th i s respec t . 
In W.V.W. (1964), the court decided i t had no power ur)der 
any s t a t u t e , rule of cour t , or any inherent power to order to 
blood t e s t . In H.V.H. (1966) the Court held tha t i t had power 
to order a c h i l d ' s blood to be tested but would never do so 
where the r e s u l t might be against the ch i ld ' s I n t e r e s t . Tho 
courts when exercising t h e i r inherent powers to order blood 
t e s t s , w i l l refuse i t which may prejudice the i n f an t ' s i n t e r e s t . 
Section 20 of P a r t - I I I of the Family Law Reform Act 1969 confirms 
the power of the court to require the use of blood t e s t s , however, 
i t r e t a ins the courts d iscret ionary powers to refuse to make an 
o rder . This l e g i s l a t i o n has not introduced any new principle 
what/did was that i t legit imize the course which Br i t i sh judiciary 
has taken by grant ing i t the d i s c r e t i on , which can be exercised 
by the courts both pos i t ive ly and negatively in appropriate cases. 
"Section 20( l ) provides t ha t the court 'may' give d i rec t ion 
for the use of blood t e s t s . I do not think that the provision 
can possibly be intend to confirm an unfettered d iscre t ion on 
these courts . . . . the Act gives no guidance as to t h e circums tancej 
in which blood t e s t s should be ordered and I think that th is mean 
t ha t superior courts are to s e t t l e pr inc ip les in so far as i t 
i s necessary to disturb ex is t ing law in order to comply with the 
Act, and the rea f t e r the lower courts are to apply those pr inciples 
10 to cases which came before them". 
"I think tha t the f ina l abo l i t ion of the old strong 
presumption of legitimacy by Section 26 of the 1969 Act shows 
t h a t in the view of Parliament, public policy no longer requires 
t h a t special pro tec t ion should be given by the law to the s ta tus 
come 
of legitimacy the t ruth must/out, and, indeed that truth 
11 
should out ruat collum". 
In W.V. Off ic ia l S o l i c i t o r , he said s In my opinion when 
a court is asked to decide a pa te rn i ty i s sue , i t i s in the best 
i n t e r e s t s of every-one that i t should do i t on the best evidence 
a v a i l a b l e . The issue of such importance affects so many people 
1 ^ tha t i t should be decided on a l l evidence and not half of i t . ' 
The pos i t ion in India r e l a t i n g to the power of the courts 
' i n paterni ty proceedings' i s s imi la r to that of England, and 
very r igh t ly we can say that the Ind ia ' s pos i t ion can be t a l l i ed 
with pre-1969 Br i t i sh pos i t ion . The Indian jud ic ia ry is passing 
through the same t rack , which the Br i t i sh jud ic ia ry has passed. 
When the chronology of jud ic ia l pronouncements in India, where 
the courts confronted with the problem of ordering compulsory 
10. S^ V. S^ (1970) 3 All . E.R. 10?, 113. 
11 . Ibid. 
12. (1970) 1 All .E.R. 1159 
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blood t e s t . They jus t i f i ed t h e i r orders one way or the other. 
The r e su l t being no uniform and ce r t a in law is developed. 
Their reasons were baaed more on common sense and sociology 
of i n t e r e s t s of the par t i es than on s t r i c t l ega l p r inc ip l e s . 
In those cases where one par ty is in te res ted in blood 
t e s t evidence but the other party refused to submit for the 
t e s t . The in te res ted pa r t i e s always t r i ed to convince the 
cour t s that the courts in India have power to order for the 
t e s t and the court can draw th i s power from the various provi-
s ions of Indian Statutory Laws e . g . , in State of Bombay v« Kathi 
Kalu.^^ the court observed that what i s forbidden under 
Ar t i c l e 20{3) i s to compel a person to say something from his 
personal knowledge r e l a t i n g to charge against him. The person 
submitting for blood t e s t i s not giving any personal testimony 
t h a t i s \by not h i t by Ai'ticle 20(3) . 
14 
In P. Venkataawaralu v . P» Subbayya. the learned ;judge 
below,ordered to appear for blood t e s t on the appl ica t ion by 
p l a i n t i f f under Section 151 C.P.C. But the High Court reversed 
the order and said ; "Section 151 has been introduced into the 
code to give ef fect to inherent powers of the c o u r t s . Such 
powers can only be exercised exdebit io jus t i ae and not on ihe 
mere vo l i t ion of courts or invocation of p a r t i e s . 
15 in ^ubbavva Sounder v. Bhoopala Subramanium , the ocjurt 
observed that in India there i s no provision e i t h e r in C.P.C. , 
13 . AIR 1961 SC 1808. 
U . AIR (38) 1951 Madras 910 (1 ) . 
15 . AIR 195 9 Madras 396. 
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Or .P .O. or Evidence Act, empowering cou r t s t o d i r e c t such a t e s t 
t o be made. 
16 In Lokamma v . Sundara Sapa lya . a c t i n g under Sect ion 401 
r e a d with S e c t i o n 397 and also with Sect ion 482, Cr .P .C. the 
c o u r t d i r e c t e d the Magis t ra te t o have the p e t i t i o n e r and the 
respondan t to examined. J u s t i c e Noronha observed t h a t : 
" I t i s an impor tan t t e s t and would go a long way in the ends of 
j u s t i c e " . 
An a t t empt has been made with a view t o give a b r i e f 
s u r v e y of the v a r i o u s ; )udic ia l v e r d i c t s i n t h e i r chronology and 
t o observe the sy s t ema t i c development of the law in t h i s r e s p e c t , 
f i r s t i n England l e a d i n g t o t h e enactment of two l e g i s l a t i o n 
i . e . P a r t - I l l of the Family Law Reform Act, 1969, and the blood 
t e a t (evidence of p a t e r n i t y ) Regula t ions Act 1971. Secondly, 
how J u d i c i a r y t r i e d and f a i l e d t o ad jus t the blood t e s t evidence 
i n t o the e x i s t i n g l e g a l framework and how t h e l e g i s l a t i v e i n a c t i o n 
i s proved to be the f o r e - r u n n e r of j u d i c i a l f a i l u r e , and why the 
j u d i c i a r y i s in want of l e g i s l a t i v e c l a r i t y in t h i s r e s p e c t . 
PLAN OF STUDY 
The present work i s . a l l about t h i s concept of p a t e r n i t y in 
v a r i o u s l e g a l sys tems , blood t e s t ev idence , DM impr in t ing and 
the power of the c o u r t s t o order compulsory blood t e s t , i s divided 
16. (1976) O r . L . J . 1962 and 1963 (Paras 5 and 6) 
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in to three chapters . 
The f i r s t chapter deals v/ith the concepts of pa te rn i ty 
in Engl ish, Islamic and Indian Law and the points of s i m i l a r i -
t i e s are highlighted and a c r i t i c a l evaluation of the points of 
difference has been t r i ed in a l l the three systems. The second 
chapter examines the blood t e s t techniques to procure the scien-
t i f i c evidence of paterni ty in the disputed cases and th i s 
chapter a lso deals with the study of D.N.A. imprinting techniques 
and i t s app l ica t ion in the determination of pa te rn i ty and i t s 
relevance in the paterni ty s u i t s . The thi rd chapter examineu 
the power of the courts to order compulsory blood t e s t s in 
English, American and Indian legal systems, the relevant 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l provis ions , s ta tu tory provis ions and the jud ic ia l 
pronouncements in the landmark decis ions . The order of the 
development of the law i s t r i ed to be p resen t . The important-
l e g i s l a t i v e enactments are a l so discussed at the r ight p laces . 
I t has been tried to present the development of law on 
the point in the same order as i t i s being developed'by the 
d i f fe ren t l ega l systems. 
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C H A P T E R - I 
COIJCEPT OF PATERNITY IN VARIOUS LEGAL SYSTEMS 
PART - A : ENGLISH LAW 
Pol ic.y of Lav/ 
The paternity? of a child is a biological fact and it 
does mean that the paternity of a man lie in a man who fathered 
(begotted) him so paternity is a question of fact. On the other 
hand legitimacy means that a child is born of legally recognised 
union and if the child is born of an illicit union or as a 
result of casual act of intercourse the child would be illegiti-
mate. When the legitimacy of a child proved the paternity of 
that child is automatically proved. But all proved paternities 
are not legitimacies. 
By proof of paternity means, we are proving the biologica 
father of the child. And all biological fathers of a child are 
not the fathers of that'child in law. For example, if A is born 
to his mother B, the mother conceived by Mr. G and B and C are 
not husband and wife in law then the A is the son of C in biolog. 
but not in law, or G is the father of A in biology but not in 
law. Here in law legitimacy is more important than paternity 
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because a l l l ega l consequences i . e . maintenance and inheri tance 
e t c . of the chi ld are bound by his legitimacy not of his pa te r -
n i t y . But the evidence of pa te rn i ty i s a very important 
evidence in the proceedings of legitimacy, adu l te ry . 
In order to define the concept of pa t e rn i ty in a legal 
system we have to go in deep in i t s concept r e l a t i n g to l e g i t i -
macy and the r e l a t i o n between the two i . e . pa tern i ty and 
legitimacy which has been discussed above in shor t , but a 
deta i led discussion of the legitimacy wi l l give r i s e a c lear 
pic ture of pa tern i ty a l s o . So here we w i l l discuss the paterni ty 
and legitimacy simultaneously. 
I t is not easy to define legitimacy as an abstract 
concept without reference t o a pa r t i cu la r l ega l system. 
Nevertheless most systems of law have drawn a d i s t inc t ion 
between the lega l pos i t ion of a child born of a legally 
recognised union and that of a child born of an i l l i c i t 
union or a casual act of sexual in te rcourse . The Common Law, 
l ike Roman and modern system based upon i t , adopted the rule 
that no child could be legi t imate unless i t was e i ther born 
or conceived in wedlock. 
To a student of Comparative Law, western family laws 
r e l a t i n g to legitimacy and parentage r e f l e c t s cer ta in i n t e r e s t -
ing antimonies which c rea tes tension between the law and the 
l i f e . On the one hand he noticed the influece of philosophy 
of or ig ina l s in and f a l l from grace and the policy of 
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maintaining the stability and integrity of the family unit that 
can justify the counting discrimination against the illegitimate 
child. On the other hand, there is a philosophy that the law 
should not discriminate against any child or impose disabilitiea 
on him by reason of the accident of his birth. 
This cleavage of philosophy is noticeable in the majority 
and minority opinion contained in the report of the Royal 
2 
Commission on Marriage and Divorce in England. 
Despite the fact that our general social attitudes have 
become increasingly more relaxed and tolerant towards individual 
shortcomings and illegitimacy today does not subject a bastard 
to the severe disabilities of the past, the legal relationship 
between a child and his parents still depends to a large extent 
upon whether or not he is legitimate. Parentage and filiation 
have very important legal effects on inheritance, maintenance, 
marriage and guardianship of person and property. 
1. Priedmann, Law in a Changing Society, 253 (1959)-
2. Report of the Royal Commission in Marriage and Divorce, 1956, 
Section 1180 -
A minority of seven members took the view that the differen-
tiation between legitimate and illegitimate children, stigma-
tised children for the shortcomings of their parents and 
socially it was justifiable to legitimate any children, born 
at any time to a man and woman who, subsequently, become 
husband and wife. A majority of the Commission, however, 
d.eplored and held that so long as marriage was held to be 
voluntary union for life of one man with one woman, subsequent 
legitimation of children conceived by some other person would 
be wholly incompatiable. This would lead to blurring of moral 
values in the public mind and "a powerful deterrent to illicit 
relations " 
16 
The GoQtnon Lav/ rule ia that a child is legitimate if his 
parents were lawfully married either at the time of his concep-
tion or at the time of the child's birth. A child will be 
legitimate if his parents were married at the time of his 
conception, even though the marriage was terminated before his 
birth. Consequently a posthumous child will be legitimate, as 
will be one whose parents marriage was terminated by divorce 
3 
between the time of his conception and his birth.^ 
There may be one case where he will be legitimate although 
his parents were married neither when he was conceived nor he was 
born. If he is conceived as the result of premarital intercourse 
and hia parents then marry, but his father dies before his birth, 
he will presumably be legitimate. It is, thus, obvious that 
4 
legitimacy is basically a question of fact. 
Here respectfully I submit that legitimacy is not always 
essentially a matter of fact. But paternity is always a matter 
of fact, which can not be assigned by the operation of any law 
unless it is proved that the father has really begotten the 
mother of the child either by pre or post marital intercourne 
or even after the termination of their marital tie. The pater-
nity does never depend on marital status of the parents but it 
is a biological fact i.e. by whoas sperm the ovum of child'o 
mother is got fertilised which resulted in the birth of the child. 
3. Knowles v. Knowles (1962) I All.E.R. 659. 
4. P.M. Bromly, Family Law 280 (1976) 
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As a matter of soc ia l policy law leans heavily in favour 
of legitimacy of chi ldren born during the subsistence of a valid 
v;edlock. Bastardizing the chi ldren without cl inching proof of 
legitimacy is brought with serious disadvantage to the children 
in pa r t i cu la r and ev i l consequences t o the society in general. 
The sanct i ty of marriage as a socia l i n s t i t u t i o n roust be given 
a cover of pro tec t ion by law. As i s often said maternity i s of 
fac t but pa tern i ty i s of opinion and surmise. Hence married 
mothers must be protected from being dragged to courts of law 
to defend their- v i r t ue in su i t coocked up by greedy and trouble-
some le t igent r e l a t i v e s . Nevertheless, while i t i s unjust and 
unconsionable to f o i s t pa tern i ty and i t s at tendant r e spons ib i l i -
t i e s on a man who by a l l reasons could not have been the father 
of the chi ld . Hence, while the law should fu l ly pro tec t and 
safeguard legi t imacy, i t should a l so allow proof of fac ts which 
render pa te rn i ty highly improbable in a pa r t i cu la r case . ' 
In England the aforesaid policy and the objective of the 
f a c t of pa te rn i ty were achieved lega l ly by the device of a 
presumption. Originally a conclusive presumption in favour of 
legit imacy ex is t in cer ta in cases . Thus, where a husband and 
wife have cohabited together and no impotancy is prooved the 
issue is conclusively presumed to be legi t imate though the wife 
i s known to have been at the same time the gu i l ty of in f ide l i ty .^ 
5 . V.N. ffegeshwara Rao, Conclusive Proof of Legitimacy under 
Section 112, Evidence Act, p . 36; V.94 Cr .L.J . 1988. 
6 . (1833) 5 C. and p . 6O4 
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This l e g a l presumption t h a t he i s the f a t h e r whom the 
n u p t i a l show to be so i s the founda t ion of every man's b i r t h 
and s t a t u s . I t i s p l a i n and s e n s i b l e maxim which i s the 
c o r n e r s t o n e , the very founda t ion , on which r e s t the whole f ab r i c 
of s o c i e t y and if i t i s allowed once t o be shaken the re la no 
s ay ing what consequence may f o l l o w . A chi ld born of a wirr led 
woman i s to be presumed to be the ch i ld of t h e husband, unleaa 
t h e r e i s evidence which excludes a l l doubts t h a t the husband 
could not be the f a t h e r . The presumption of l eg i t imacy p laces 
t h e burden of proving the i l l e g i t i m a c y of a c h i l d to a married 
i s 
woman or whoever a s s e r t s t h a t h e / i l l e g i t i m a t e . The presump-
t i o n can be r e b u t t e d by proving t h a t no sexual i n t e r c o u r s e took 
p l a c e between the husband and the wife during t h e pos s ib l e 
p e r i o d wi th in which the ch i ld must have been conceived or t h a t 
d e s p i t e such i n t e r c o u r s e , t h e husband was not the f a t h e r as the 
mother had o ther l o v e r s a t the same t i m e . In the l e t t e r case i t 
was almost imposs ib le fo r a husband t o d i spu te the p a t e r n i t y of 
a ch i l d born to h i s w i f e . 
The presumpt ion of l eg i t imacy cont inues if t he wife i s 
shown to have committed a d u l t e r y with any number of men, the 
law w i l l not permi t an enquiry whether the husband or some other 
man i s more l i k e l y t o the f a t h e r of the c h i l d , and i t must be 
7 . Routledge v . C a r r u t h e r s , Nicholas Adult Bas t , 161. 
8 . S.M. Hasan, Muslim Law of Legi t imacy and Sec t ion 112 of the 
Indian Evidence Act, Is lamic Law in Modern I n d i a , 193-94 
ILIG ( e d i t e d by Tahir Mahmood, 1972) . 
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aff i rmat ive ly proved before the child can be bastardized that 
the husband did not have sexual intercourse with his wife at 
9 
the time v/hen i t was conceived. 
10 In Prancis v . F ranc i s , where a husband fa i led to rebut 
the presumption that he was the fa ther of his wife 's child even 
though she admitted commission of adul tery at the time of concep-
t i o n and he proved that he was habi tua l ly wearing a contraceptive 
sheal th for sexual intercourse during the relevant per iod. 
?reaumptloM of Legitimacy and Gestation Period 
The presumption of legitimacy equally applies where the 
child i s born within the possible period of ges ta t ion af ter the 
marriage has been terminated by the husband^ death or by final 
decree of divorce or n u l l i t y . It has been said that the average 
period of ges ta t ion is 280 days, the court can not accept th i s 
as a f ac t without expert evidence and medical witnesses have 
proved d i f f i c u l t to t i e down to e i t he r a minimum or a maximum 
period . 
The shor tes t period of gestat ion which has been accepted 
11 by English Courts i s 174 days. But no spec i f ic maximum and 
minimum periods of ges ta t ion are j u d i c i a l l y recognised. 
9. 3 Halsbury's Laws of England, 88 (3rd e d . ) 
10. (1960) D.C. p . 17. 
11. Clark v. Clark (No. l ) 1939 p . 228. 
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The House of Lorda refused to hold t h a t the b i r t h of a 
c h i l d 560 days a f t e r the l a s t p o s s i b l e da te of matrimonial 
i n t e r c o u r s e was of i t s e l f proof of a d u l t e r y . I t was a l so c i t e d 
t h e p receden t s t o remark t h a t even the normal per iod of human 
g e s t a t i o n has from time t o time been d i f f e r e n t l y s t a t e d , e . g . 
2 70-275 days , 173-280 days.""^ 
In Goakil v . Goskil , on the b a s i s of medical tes t imony 
i t has been held t h a t a per iod of 331 days was q u i t e p o s s i b l e . 
But when M.T.V.M.T. and O f f i c i a l S o l i c i t o r c i t e d in the Pres ton 
Jones c a s e , the exper t tes t imony was l a i d t o show t h a t the irjter-
v a l of 21 days between c o i t u s and f e r t i l i z a t i o n as had been 
sugges ted in G-oskil 's c a s e , was not a u t h e n t i c , i t was held t h a t 
a lapse of 349 days between c o i t u s and t h e b i r t h of a normal 
baby was i m p o s s i b l e . 
Lord Mac Permott observed : The Law of England has not 
f ixed l i m i t s of dev i a t i on from the normal per iod in the sense 
t h a t more than a c e r t a i n per iod or l e s s than a c e r t a i n per iod 
i s to be deemed imposs ib le , p o s s i b l e un less the cont ra ry i s 
p roved . He then proceeded t o observe t h a t a time must come 
when with the per iod f a r in excess of the normal the cour t may 
p r o p e r l y regard i t s length as proving t h e w i f e ' s adu l t e ry 
beyond reasonab le doubt . 
' ' 2 - P r e s t o n Jones v . P res ton Jones (1981) A.C. 391 (H.L.) 
13 . (1921) p . 425 
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Legitimation Per Subsequence Matrlmonlutn 
Legitimation by subsequent marriage, t h i s doctrine i s 
nov/ widely recognised in Common Law world. The Legitimacy Act 
1926 introduced the p r inc ip le of legi t imat ion into English Law. 
This p r inc ip le render an i l l eg i t ima te child legit imate whose 
paren t s marry after any time af ter his b i r t h . Section 8 of 
the Act has provided that a person sha l l be regarded as l e g i t i -
mated for the purpose of English Law if the fa ther was domiciled 
in a country recognising ' l eg i t imat ion per subsequence matrirao-
nium' at the time of the marriage 
Section 1 of the Legitimacy Act 1926 has provided "where 
the parents of an i l l eg i t ima te person marry or have married one 
another , whether before or a f te r the commencement of t h i s Act, 
the marriage s h a l l , if the father of i l l eg i t ima te person was or 
i s a t the date of marriage doraioiled in England or Wales, render 
that person, if l i v i n g , legit imate from the commencement of this 
Act, or from the date of the marriage, whichever l a s t happens". 
In Gj, V. _C_j_ t the Judge Homer observed that the l e g i t i -
macy i s a question of s t a t u s . This s t a tus of legitimacy can 
be obtained by being born legit imate or by being legitimated 
by v i r tue of the provision of the Act. The p la in t i f f had 
a t ta ined that s t a tu s and i t i s an i r r e l evan t considerat ion 
whether she a t ta ined i t in one vvay or the other . 
U . (1947) 2 Al l . E.R. 50 
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PART-B : ISLAMIC LAW 
P u r i t y of Conception 
The I s lamic Law has i t s own r u l e s r e l a t i n g to the l e g i t i -
macy, paren tage and acknowledgement of p a t e r n i t y , and d i f f e r s 
from the other l e g a l systems in t h i s r e s p e c t . Due t o s t r i c t 
adherence to the s t r i c t p r i n c i p l e s of p u r i t y with regard to 
c o n c e p t i o n , the concept of p a t e r n i t y and the l eg i t imacy of child 
i s d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e from o ther l e g a l systems i . e . Engl ish le^a l 
system and Indian s e c u l a r l ega l sys tem. 
The Is lamic Law embodies the p r i n c i p l e of s t r i c t enforce-
ment of sexual mora l i t y by p r o h i b i t i n g a t the pain of var ious 
punishments sexual r e l a t i o n s h i p except when i t i s between husband 
and w i f e . Under s e v e r a l western sys tems , sexual r e l a t i o n s h i p 
o u t s i d e wedlock i s not a l ega l offence un les s i t is aggravated 
by c i rcumstances such as lack of c o n s e n t , the younger age of 
the g i r l , the blood r e l a t i o n s h i p of the person concerned or 
u n n a t u r a l behaviour which w i l l give r i s e to c r imina l offence of 
15 
r a p e , unnatura l c a r n a l , i n c e s t , b e s t i a l i t y or sodomy. Under 
I s l amic Law, paren tage i s e s t a b l i s h e d e i t h e r -
i ) by b i r t h dur ing a r egu la r ( a l so i r r e g u l a r , not void) 
mar r i age , or 
i i ) by acknowledgement, but i t must be noted t h a t adoption 
i s not recognised under Is lamic sys tem. The western 
system of l e g i t i m a t i o n has no p lace and r e c o g n i t i o n in i t 
15 . Coulson, N .J . , " C o n f l i c t s and Tension in Islamic J u r i s p r u -
dence" (1969), p . 78 . 
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Establishment of Maternity : 
Under Sunni Law - The maternity of a child is es tabl ished in 
the woman who gave b i r th to the child I r respect ive of whether 
the b i r t h was the r e s u l t of a wedlock or zina and if a child 
produced of a zina than he i n h e r i t s from mother alone and not 
from the f a the r . 
Under Shia Law - Mere b i r th i s not suff ic ient to es tabl ish 
matern i ty . It has to be also proved that the b i r t h was a resu l t 
of a lawful marriage. And an i l l eg i t ima te child has neither 
maternity in the woman who gave b i r th to the child nor paterni ty 
in the fa ther who begot i t . The i l l eg i t ima te child can neither 
i n h e r i t from fa the r nor mother. 
Establishment of Paternity ; 
Paterni ty i s establ ished in the person said to be father 
by lega l presumption or by proof, tha t the child waa begotten 
by him on a woman who at the time of conception was his lawful 
w i f e . The western doctrine of legi t imat ion of pa te rn i ty is 
d i f f e ren t from the doctrine of acknowledgement of paterni ty in 
1 ft 
Islam. Acknowledgement of pa te rn i ty by farther may ar ise on]\' : 
i) where the pa terni ty of a child i s not known or entabl i::,hed 
beyond the doubt, 
i i ) i t is not proved tha t the claimant i s the off-apring of 
Zina, 
i i i ) the circumstances are such that they do not rebut the 
16- .Supra n. 15 
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17 presumption of p a t e r n i t y . 
J u s t i c e Mahmood in Muhammad Al l ahadad ' s case observed : 
"Where a l e g i t i m a t i o n proceeds upon the p r i n c i p l e s of l e g i t i m a -
t i n g c h i l d r e n , whose legi t imacy i s proved and admi t t ed , the ru l e 
of acknowledgement proceeds upon the assumption t h a t the acknow-
ledged chi ld i s not only the o f f - s p r i n g of t h e acknowledger by 
b l o o d , but a l s o the issue of a lawful union between the acknowled-
1R ger and the mother of the c h i l d " . 
Legi t imacy i s a s t a t u s which r e s u l t s from c e r t a i n f a c t s , 
l e g i t i m a t i o n i s a proceeding which c r e a t e s a s t a t u s which did 
not e x i s t b e f o r e . In the proper sense the re i s no l e g i t i m a t i o n 
1 9 
under Is lamic Law. 
20 Recen t ly , i n S.A. Huasain v . Ra.iamma, the Andhra High 
Court held t h a t where the p a t e r n i t y of a c h i l d can not be proved 
by e s t a b l i s h i n g a marr iage between the p a r e n t s . Is lamic Lav; 
r e c o g n i s e s 'Acknowledgement' as a method, where by such marriage 
and l e g i t i m a t e decent can be e s t a b l i s h e d as a matter of auba-
t a n t i v e law fo r purposes of i n h e r i t a n c e . This doc t r i ne does not 
apply t o a case where i l l e g i t i m a c y of the ch i ld i s proved and 
e s t a b l i s h e d e i t h e r because the lawful marr iage between the parents 
of t he ch i ld i s impossible or the marriage i t s e l f be ing diuproved. 
17 . Supra n. 15. 
13. Mohammad Allahadad Khan v . Mohammad Ismai l Khan (1988) 
10 A l l . 189 a t 341 . 
^9 . Habibur Rahman v . Altaf All (1921) 4 8 , I .A . 114. 
2 0 . A . I . R . (1977) A.P. 155. 
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The doctr ine applies only in cases of unce r t a in i ty . 
Qura'nic Sanctions 
There i s no spec i f ic Ayat in the Holy Qura'n which deals 
with pa t e rn i ty and legi t imacy. There are tv/o Ayats - one in 
'Surah-al-Baqarah' and other in 'Surah-al-Talaq ' from which 
guidance r e l a t i n g to ru les of paterni ty and legitimacy may be 
i n f e r r ed . The basis of the concept of ' I d d a t ' is to be found 
in the following Qura'nic Ayats. 
"Divorced women sha l l wait concerning themselves 
for three monthly per iods . Nor i t i s lawful for 
them to hide what Allah hatched created in t he i r 
21 wombs". 
"0 Prophet(SAW) I When you divorce women, divorce 
them at their prescribed periods, and count 
(accurately) their prescribed periods". 
"Such of your women as have passed the age of 
monthly courses, for them the prescribed period, 
if ye have doubts, is three months, and for 
those who have no courses (it is the same). 
"For those carry (life within their wombs) 
their period is until they deliver their 
burden". * 
Islamic Family Law prescribes the menstrual yardstick of 
'Iddat', the waiting period that must elapse before a woman or a 
21. Al-Qura'n (2:228), Translated by Abdullah Yusuf Ali. 
22. I^. (65:1) 
23. Id. (65:4) 
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widow can seek remarr iage s i n c e a p regnan t woman ceases to 
mens t rua te f o r the remaining dura t ion of her pregnancy. The 
' I d d a t ' i s a safeguard to determine whether or not she i s 
c a r r y i n g a chi ld from her p rev ious husband. This a l s o means 
t h a t outcome of ' I d d a t ' should diagnose the leg i t imacy of the 
o f f - s p r i n g with r a m i f i c a t i o n fo r muslim l e g a l p rov i s ions fo r 
m h e r i t a n c e . 
Sanct ion of Hadith 
The e s t a b l i s h m e n t of parentage i s based on the P r o p h e t ' s 
(SAW) s a y i n g , the i s sue be longs to the bad and fo r the a d u l t e r e r 
25 t h e r e i s s t o n i n g . 
The per iod of g e s t a t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , assumes importance 
in de te rmin ing l eg i t imacy . 
The Hanafis c i t e the t r a d i t i o n of Hazrat Ayesha in supyiort 
of t h e i r argument t h a t ' t h e chi ld does not remain a moment "longer 
than two yea r s in the womb of i t s m o t h e r ' . 
The Hanafis say t h a t the said op in ion of. Hazrat Ayealia 
could only be based on hea r ing i t from Prophet(SAW). According 
to the wel l known d i c t a of Imam Malik, S h a f i ' i and Ahmad Ibn 
Hanble , the longes t per iod of pregnancy i s fou r y e a r s . 
24 . Munawar Ahmad Aneea, Menstruat ion and Menopouse, Paronia 
r e v i s e d , p . 17, Mass J . Is lamic Sc ience , Jan-June , 19SB/ 
1408 A.H. 
2 5 . 
26 . Durrul Mukhtar, p . 282. 
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I t i s r e p o r t e d from Walid b . Muslim t h a t he, said : "I 
mentioned before Imam Malik the t r a d i t i o n waJ-ranted by Jamila 
B in t Saad as s t a t e d from Ayesha t h a t no woman can remain 
p regnan t for more than two y e a r s " . Imam Malik s a i d , good God : 
who can say t h i s ? The wife of Muhammad b . Aj lah , in my neigh-
bourhood, remained pregnant fo r four yea r s and the wife of AJlah 
gave b i r t h t o t h r e e c h i l d r e n and each chi ld remained in the womb 
f o r fou r y e a r s . S i m i l a r l y , Muhammad b . Abd Allah b . Hasan b . 
9 7 
Ali remained in t h e womb of her mother f o r four yea r s . " 
Legi t imacy and G e s t a t i o n Period 
The per iod from concept ion upto the d e l i v e r y of the chi ld 
i s g e s t a t i o n p e r i o d . In the normal n a t u r a l courses the g e s t a t i o n 
p e r i o d i s g e n e r a l l y nine lunar months with some f l u c t u a t i o n s . Due 
to t h i s f l u c t u a t i o n the exact time per iod of g e s t a t i o n as a ru l e 
can not be l a i d down, ins t ead a range from minimum to maximum 
time per iod of g e s t a t i o n ia t r i e d to l a i d down under var ious 
l e g a l sys tems. I s lamic law r e l a t i n g to the g e s t a t i o n per iod a l so 
l a i d down t h e minimum and maximum period of g e s t a t i o n . 
Minimum per iod of g e s t a t i o n -
All the schools of I s lamic Jur i sprudence agreed upon the 
s h o r t e s t , s ix months per iod of g e s t a t i o n f ixed by the Holy Qura 'n. 
Radd-ul-Mukhtar s a y s , t h a t t-be s h o r t e s t per iod of g e s t a t i o n I s six 
2 7 . Ibn Qudama Al-Maqdisi : Al-Mughni, Cairo (1367 A.H.) 
Vol . v i i , pp . 477-78 . 
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months, accord ing to a l l four Imams without d i f f e r e n c e . Accor-
d i n g to I s lamic Law, 
i ) A ch i ld born w i t h i n s ix months of marr iage is i l l e g i t i -
mate , u n l e s s the f a t h e r acknowledges i t . In o ther worda, 
a ch i ld born a f t e r a t l e a s t s ix months from the date of 
marr iage i s presumed t o be l e g i t i m a t e , un l e s s the pu ta -
t i v e f a t h e r d i sc l a ims i t . The s h o r t e s t period of 
g e s t a t i o n has been accepted by the Engl ish Court i s 
174 d a y s . 2 ^ 
Maximum period of g e s t a t i o n -
The p e r u s a l of r e l e v a n t Qura 'n i c p r o v i s i o n s r e v e a l s tha t 
t h i r t y months time i s needed for g e s t a t i o n and suck l ing the milk 
of mother. The time of t h i r t y months i s b i fu r ca t ed i n t o two 
p a r t s '• two years fo r b r e a s t feeding and s i x months for g e s t a t i o n 
of the c h i l d . On t h i s a n a l o g i c a l deduct ion of the Qura 'n ic 
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p r o v i s i o n s . Is lamic J u r i s t s have unan imi ty . Under Is lamic 
Law, a ch i ld born a f t e r the t e r m i n a t i o n of marriage i s l e g i t i m a t e , 
if born : 
i ) w i t h i n 10 l una r months in Shia Law, 
i i ) wi th in 2 lunar years in Hanafi Law, and 
i i i ) wi th in 4 lunar years i n S h a f i ' i , or Maliki and 
Hanaf i Law. 
Hanafi J u r i s t s r e l y on Qura 'n ic p r o v i s i o n s and Hadith repor ted by 
2 8 . Clark v . Clark (1939) Al l .E .R . 228 . 
2 9 . Tanzeelur Rahman, MaJmua-e-Qawaneen-e-Islam, Vol. I l l , 
850-851 , Islamabad (1976) 
3 0 . A.A.A. Fyzee, Ou t l ines of Mohammadan Law, 181 (ed . 1964) 
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3 1 Hazrat Ayesha : 
" . . . . Regarding the longes t per iod of g e s t a t i o n , Jung 
i s of the view t h a t 10 months i s the per iod f ixed by the Shia 
J u r i s t s and a l so accepted by many of the Sunni J u r i s t s . The 
p e r i o d of t h e two yea r s as the maximum was assigned by the Imam 
Abu Hanifa on the a u t h o r i t y of Hazrat Ayesha, who i s r epor ted 
to have sa id as having rece ived i t from the Prophet (SAW) him-
s e l f , t h a t a ch i l d remains no longer than 2 years in the womb 
of i t s mother, even so much as the turn of a whee l" . 
The maximum pe r iod of g e s t a t i o n f ixed by the Muslim 
J u r i s t s have been c r i t i z e d on the ground t h a t they are not 
b o r n out by the modern s c i e n t i f i c knowledge of g e s t a t i o n and 
p r egnancy . Therefore , t he 10 months of longes t period of g e s t a -
t i o n i s f ixed by the Shia J u r i s t s a l so accepted by the Sunni 
J u r i s t s . According t o Imam Abu Hanifa , b i r t h must take place 
w i t h i n t h e two years of divorce or d i s s o l u t i o n of mar r i age , the 
dictum of Abu Hanifa i s based on the a u t h o r i t y of Hazrat Ayeshn's 
i n s t a n c e , and the muslim t e x t s r e f e r to s t o r i e s about the 
' s l e e p i n g f a c t u s ' . ^ 
The main focus of the c r i t i c i s m i s d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t the 
longes t pe r iod of g e s t a t i o n , which in i t s e l f so d i v e r g e n t . 
Before the enactment of Evidence Act, the C a l c u t t a had decl ined 
/ - \ 
3 1 . M.U.S. Jung, A d i s s e r t a t i o n on Muslim Law of Legit imacy, 4 . 
3 2 . I b i d , p . 13. 
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to apply the Muslim Personal Law re la t ing to Legitimacy to a 
case in which the child was born nineteen months af ter the date 
of d ivorce , on the ground t h a t to hold that such a child was 
leg i t imate would be 'contrary to the course of nature and 
imposs ib le• . ^ 
The question as to why some of the muslim exponants of 
law streched the length of the period of gestat ion to two and 
four years have been posed by several commentators, notably 
western scholars , and they have come out with the i r own explana-
t i o n s . Some have a t t r i b u t e d th i s to the imperfect knowledge of 
ges ta t ion prevalent in ear ly t ime. B a i l l i e points out that the 
sunnite doctors in laying down such long period had in view 
those abnormal conditions which 'sometime preplex the most 
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s k i l l f u l of medical facul ty in Europe. On t h i s aspect the 
observation of Prof. Tahir Mahmood is per t inent to be quoted : 
"We, however, submit that t h i s i s not the true bas is of 
c l a s s i c a l v e r d i c t s . The fact i s tha t in view of the legal d i s -
a b i l i t i e s and soc ia l sufferings of i l l eg i t ima te chi ldren and the 
c r imina l l i a b i l i t y of t h e i r parents a t Islamic Law, and in 
accordance with Is lam's expectation on a very high standard of 
sexual morality from the followers, the policy of Muslim Law to 
regard every child as legi t imate as f a r as poss ib le . I t is out 
of anxiety to keep chi ldren away from the stigma of i l legi t imacy 
3 3 . Ashraf Ali v . As ad Al i (1871) 16 W.E. 260. 
34 . Ameer A l i , Mohammadan Law, Vol. 2 (1894) p . 193. 
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t h a t Muslim Law p r e s c r i b e s unduly long p e r i o d s aa maximum 
pe r iod of g e s t a t i o n . In doing so Muslim Law does not worry 
whether the pe r iods so p r e s c r i b e d by i t ag ree or do not agree 
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wi th the p a r a l l e l r u l e s of o b s t e t r i c s . ' 
In Umar Hayat v . Mis r i Khan.^ the Lahore High Court 
observed t h a t : 
" I t i s obvious t h a t the va ry ing per iods of pregnancy 
g i v e n in books of medical j u r i sp rudence and the maximum per iods 
f i x e d by the Muslim Law r e l a t e s t o abnormal c a s e s , and in each 
case i t i s for the p l a i n t i f f , who a l l e g e s t h a t t h e r e were 
abnormal c i r cums tances a t t e n d i n g h i s b i r t h to show t h a t they 
e x i s t e d " . 
R e f e r r i n g t o t h e dictum of Abu Hanifa, M.U.S. Jung says , 
"We cannot argue t h a t the g r e a t Imam has f ixed 2 yea r s as the 
l o n g e s t per iod of g e s t a t i o n , because t h i s r u l e i s t o be read 
t o g e t h e r with t h e p rov i s ions t h a t while observing the period 
of ' I d d a t ' the woman must dec l a r e t h a t she i s p r e g n a n t . This 
f a c t i s to be decided wi th in per iod of I d d a t . And if (3eolaration 
t o woman were to cont inue and exceed the n a t u r a l maximum l i m i t 
of g e s t a t i o n , the case then would be f u l l y covered by the 2 
y e a r s r u l e of Imam Abu Hanlfa".^'^ 
3 5 . Tahir Mahmood 'Muslim Law 'of Leg i t imacy ' , Al igarh Law 
J o u r n a l , Vol. V (1973 e d . ) 
3 6 . A . I . E . (1924) Lahore 477. 
3 7 . Supra n. 32 . 
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Prof . Coulaon has some apprehension in h i s mind regarding 
the per iod of g e s t a t i o n f ixed by sunn i t e d o c t o r s may give to 
v a r i o u s abuses a re not wel l founded" . Modern s c i e n t i f i c 
r e s e a r c h e s show t h a t the per iod of g e s t a t i o n i s always subject 
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t o doub t . I t i s not in our power t o f i x l i m i t to g e s t a t i o n . 
39 The House of Lord in Pres ton Jones v . Pres ton Joneg, 
observed t ha t if j u d i c i a l no t ice was t aken of normal per iod of 
g e s t a t i o n (which i s var iably given as 270 t o 280 days or as 9 
mon ths ) , j u d i c i a l n o t i c e should a l s o be taken by the Court of 
t h e f a c t t h a t the normal period i s not always fo l lowed . 
According to the t h e s i s of N . J . Coulson t h a t the Sunni 
J u r i s t s s t reched the pe r iod of g e s t a t i o n too much, t o avoid 
the e f f e c t s of i l l e g i t i m a c y , may give r i s e to the impress ion 
t h a t t h e s e maximum l i m i t s were devised to sof ten the vigourn 
of I s l amic Law p r i n c i p l e s of s t r i c t enforcement of sexua l 
m o r a l i t y through severe punishment p r e sc r i bed fo r the offence 
of Zina . After r e f e r r i n g to the Egypt ian Reform of 1,929, ^-^oulson 
p r o c e e d s to show t h a t t e n s i o n e x i s t between idea l i sm and rea l i sm 
in I s l a m i c Law l e a d i n g t o a gap between l e g a l d o c t r i n e and legal 
40 p r a c t i c e . There could be a gape between theory and p r a c t i c e of 
law; and t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s e s a l l - l e g a l sys tems, but if Coulson 
3 8 . Taylor , Medical J u r i s p r u d e n c e , 63 (1905) 
3 9 . (1951) 1 A l l . E.R. 124 (H.L.) 
4 0 . Coulson, C o n f l i c t and Tension in Is lamic Ju r i sp rudence , 
p p . 75-76 . 
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p r e s s e s i n t o s e rv i ce these presumptions l i m i t s of g e s t a t i o n to 
demons t ra te the i n e f f i c a c y of the Is lamic Lav/ r u l e of s t r i c t 
sexua l mora l i ty then , i t i s submitted t h a t he i s unwarrantedly 
r e a d i n g too much in t he se presumpt ions . 
PABT-C : IIJDIAIT LAW 
R e b u t t a l of Legitimacy by the Es tabl i shment of P a t e r n i t y 
The gene ra l p r i n c i p l e of la-w of Evidence i s t h a t one 
who a s s e r t s must prove in the court of law but t he re are 
c e r t a i n f a c t s which a re presumed by the cour t for c e r t a i n 
r e a s o n s of po l icy as wel l as of p r i n c i p l e s , presumptions falL 
in t h i s c a t e g o r y . The e f f e c t of a presumption i s t h a t a pa r ty 
in whose favour a f a c t i s presumed i s r e l i e v e d of the i n i t i a l 
burden of proof . The cour t presumes t h e ex i s t ence of the f ac t 
in h i s favour and may ac t on i t un l e s s con t ra ry i s shown. The 
presumpt ion i s never a f i n a l t r u t h they a re prone to r e b u t t a l s . 
For example, the cour t may presume tha t a man who i s 
in p o s s e s s i o n of s t o l e n goods soon a f t e r t h e t h e f t i s 
e i t h e r the t h i e f or has r ece ived the goods knowing thera t o 
4-2 be s t o l e n , u n l e s s he can account f o r h is p o s s e s s i o n . The 
c o u r t may presume the ex i s t ence of any f a c t which i t th ink 
l i k e l y to have happened, regard being had t o t h e common course 
of n a t u r a l e v e n t s , human conduct and p u b l i c and p r i v a t e 
4 1 . S.M. Hasan, Mahmood and the Muslim Law of Legit imacy, 
Aligarh Law J o u r n a l , Vol. V, 97 (1973) 
4 2 . Sect ion 114, I l l u s t r a t i o n ( a ) , The Indian Evidence Act, 
1872 
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4 '5 busiriess, in t h e i r r e l a t i on to the facts of a particulajr case. -
Presumptions are the r e s u l t s of l ega l reasoning, argumen-
t a t i o n , enquiry, general exper iences ,probabi l i ty of any kind or 
a matter of policy or convenience in the i r appl ica t ion to 
p a r t i c u l a r sub jec t . Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act 
c l a s s i f i e d the presumptions into presumptions of fac t are 
inference drawn from experience of dai ly l i f e . Presumption 
of law, on the other hand, are the a r t i f i c i a l ru les of substan-
t ive or procedural law direct ing the courts to make cer ta in 
mandatory assumptions. Por example, the presumptions of 
innocence drawn in criminal proceedings requires tha t the 
court sha l l presume tha t the accused is innocent u n t i l his 
g u i l t i s proved by the prosecution beyond a l l reasonable doubts. 
The c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of presumptions into presumption of 
f a c t and of law coincides with another c l a s s i f i ca t ion has hnsed 
on whether the d i rec t ion to the court to presume cer ta in facts 
is recommendatory or mandatory. All presumptions of fact nro. 
merely recommendatory and the court may or may not draw tlie 
presumption depending upon the circumstances of a pa r t i cu l a r 
case . Presumptions of law,are, however, mandatory and the court 
must draw the presumptions as indicated and has no d iscre t ion in 
the matter . ^ (Praes-umptiones j u r i s sed non de jure) or 
4 3 . Supra n. 42. 
44. V.N. Kageshv/ara Rao, Conclusive Proof of Legitimacy Under 
Section 112 of Evidence Act, Cr .L.J . 
1988, p . 34. 
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(Praesuraptiones j u r i s sed de j u r e ) . Presumptions of law e i the r 
r ebu t t ab le or i r r ebu t t ab le and these are rebut table by proof of 
contrary evidence by party against v/hom the presumption is 
drawn. All the presumptions of f ac t s are r ebu t t ab l e . For 
example, under Section 82 of the Indian Penal Code, "nothing 
i s an offence which is done by a child under seven years of 
age" and t h i s is an i r rebutab le presumption formulated as 
substant ive pr inc ip le of law. On the other hand. Section 43 
of I .P.O. i s an example of a rebut table presumption of law 
and declares t h a t "nothing i s an offence which i s done by a 
ch i ld above seven years of age and under twelve, who has not 
a t ta ined su f f i c i en t maturity of understanding to judge the 
nature and consequences of his conduct on tha t occasion'.' 
While under Section 82 the prosecution is debarred from 
adducing evidence tha t , in the pa r t i cu la r case, the child 
below the age of seven has the r e q u i s i t e maturity to commit 
the offence, under Section 83 the prosecution can rebu t t the 
presumption of immunity of a child aged between seven and 
twelve by showing tha t the p a r t i c u l a r chi ld possesses su f f i -
c i e n t maturity of understanding of the nature and consequence 
of the act concerned. Thus, presumptions may be e i the r di rec-
tory or mandatory and e i t h e r rebut table or i r r e b u t t a b l e , and 
they are defined in both these senses in Section 4 of the 
Indian Evidence Act 1872 as follows : 
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"May presume" : Whenever i t ia provided by t h i s Act that 
the court may presume a f a c t , i t may e i ther regard such fact 
as proved unless and un t i l i t i s disproved or may c a l l for proof 
of i t . 
"Shall presume" : Whenever i t i s directed by t h i s Act 
tha t the court sha l l presume a f a c t , i t sha l l regard such fact 
as proved unless and un t i l i t i s disproved. 
Example - The genuineness of a document purporting to be 
the Gazette of India sha l l be presumed and a document called 
for and not produced sha l l be presumed to be duly executed and 
a t t e s t e d . 
"Conclusive Proof" : When one fac t i s declared by this 
Act to be conclusive proof of another the court sha l l on proof 
of one fact regard the other as proved and s h a l l not allow 
evidence to be given for the purpose of disproving i t . An 
a r t i f i c i a l probative effect is given by the law to cer ta in 
f a c t s and no evidence is allowed to be produced with a view to 
combatting tha t e f f e c t . 
These cases generally occurs when i t is against the 
po l icy of the government, or the i n t e r e s t of soc ie ty , that a 
matter should be fu r the r opened to d ispute . I t i s important 
to note that in the case of "sha l l presume" the party against 
whom the presumption i s necessar i ly drawn must be given an 
opportunity to disprove the f ac t presumed and if he f a i l s to 
disprove those f ac t s the presumption s tands. On the other hand, 
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ir] the case of conclusive proof the court must not only draw 
the presumption but what i s more important and c ruc ia l i s that 
i t should not allow the other party any opportunity to adduce 
evidence in disproof of the fac ts presumed. 
Presumption of Legitimacy under Indian Law -
Section 112 of the Evidence Act 1872, raised a legal 
I presumption of legit imacy appl icable to the off-spr ing of a l l 
! married couplesin Ind ia . I t lay down that a child would be 
, deemed to be leg i t imate if i t was born -
i ) e i the r 'during the continuance of a val id marriage' 
between i t s parents , or 
i i ) within 280 days a f te r i t s d issolu t ion the mother 
remaining unmarried. 
The fac t of a c h i l d ' s b i r th in e i the r of these two 
circumstances would, according to the section be, a conclualve 
proof of i t s legi t imacy, unless i t could be shown that the 
persons stated to be i t s parents never has access to each other 
at a time when i t 'could have been b e g o t t e n ' . The legal presump-
t ion ra ised by the sect ion had the effect of throwing the burden 
of proving the i l legi t imacy of a child sa t i s fy ing i t s requ i re -
ment on the person in te res ted in making i t out.^^ 
When a child ia born in wedlock, there i s a presumption 
45. Tahir Mahmood, Presumption of Legitimacy under Evidence 
Act, A century of Action and Reaction, 
Special Issue , 1975, p . 79. 
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i n f avour of i t s l e g i t i m a c y . As leg i t imacy involve sexual 
i n t e r c o u r s e \>et^een husband and wife , t h e r e i s , t h e r e f o r e , a 
presumption when a ch i ld i s conceived and bo rn during marriar,e 
t h a t such i n t e r c o u r s e took p l ace a t a t ime when, according to ^^ 
the law of n a t u r e , the husband could be the f a t h e r of t he c h i l d . 
The p r o v i s i o n has s i n c e been t r e a t e d by the c o u r t s in 
I nd i a as a g e n e r a l law de te rmin ing l eg i t imacy in the q u e s t i o n s 
i n v o l v i n g r i g h t s of i n h e r i t a n c e and maintenance e t c . under a l l 
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c i v i l , c r i m i n a l and revenue c a s e s . 
The e s s e n t i a l c o n d i t i o n f o r t h e presumption in favour of 
the l eg i t imacy of the ch i ld i s t h a t , t h a t p a r t i e s to t h e marriage 
should have had access t o each other a t any time when the ch i l d 
could have been b e g o t t e n . 
The presumption of l eg i t imacy l a r g e l y depends'upon the 
presumed f a c t t h a t the p a r t i e s to a marr iage have necessary 
exces s to each o t h e r . That i s why the presumption i s allowed 
t o be overthrown by proving t h a t t he re was no access of husband 
to h i s wife a t about the t ime when the c h i l d could have been 
48 b e g o t t e n . 
4 6 . Dixon J . i n Piggot v . P ig^o t (1939) 61 CLR 378 a t p . 412. 
4 7 . Subunna v . Venka ta red le . AIR 1950 Mad. 394. 
4 8 . See f o r example, Ra.i Bangi v , Dy. D i r e c t o r Conso l ida t ion , 
AIR 1982 A l l . 335, where the evidence was t h a t a f t e r the 
mar r iage b u t before Gauna the p a r e n t s confined t h e i r 
daugh t e r which forced the husband t o marry another woman, 
the c h i l d born to f i r s t marriage was not regarded as h i s 
l e g i t i m a t e c h i l d . 
39 
The divorce v/aa obtained hy the husband af ter three years 
of d i s s e r t a t i o n by his wife, v/hile she was l iv ing in her v i l l age 
a chi ld born to her. during th i s period was held not to be his 
c h i l d / ^ 
The cardinal ru le of presumption i s tha t the child shall 
be Rjresumed to have been born out of the val id wedlock if both 
were having access with each other. In t h i s s i tua t ion nei ther 
the husband nor the wife sha l l be allowed to / the b i r th of the 
A 
ch i ld . This could fur ther f a c i l i t a t e the child to enjoy the 
f r u i t of p a t e r n i t y . Fur ther , the presumption would not oover a 
case of a child who has not been begotten a t a time by huijband 
and wife when he should have been. In th i s s i tua t ion the burden 
of prooving of non-access ib i l i ty with a wife f a l l s upon the 
f a t h e r . This i s because no legi t imate child should suffer 
i l l e g a l l y nor an I l l eg i t ima te child should get advantage 
otherwise. 
Aoceas 
The word 'access' used in the Indian Evidence Act, 1972 
is of much importance and significance in corroborrating and 
rebutting the presumption of legitimacy under Section 112. 
Section 112 - Birth during marriage conclusive proof of 
legitimacy -
The fact that any person was born during the continuance 
of valid marriage between his mother and any man, or within 
49. Field's Law of Evidence, 1972, p. 4617. 
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280 days a f t e r i t s d i s s o l u t i o n , the mother remaining unmarried, 
s h a l l be conc lus ive proof t h a t he i s t h e l e g i t i m a t e son of t h a t 
man, u n l e s s i t can be shown t h a t the p a r t i e s to the marriage had 
no access to each other a t any time when he could have been 
b e g o t t e n . 
The word ' a c c e s s ' can be explained as an i n d i c i a of 
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o p p o r t u n i t y for m a r i t a l i n t e r c o u r s e . Access and n.on-aoueHs 
cannote e x i s t e n c e and non -ex i s t ence f o r m a r i t a l i n t e r c o u r s e / 
In B.B. Singh v . Mahesh Singh.^^ the Pr ivy Council held tha t the 
' a c c e s s ' means e f f e c t i v e acces s and p h y s i c a l i ncapac i ty to 
p r o c r e a t e , if e s t a b l i s h e d amount to ' n o n - a c c e s s ' wi thin the 
meaning of t h i s s e c t i o n . 
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I t was observed in Siva Kani Ammal v . Koolyandi G h e l l i a r , 
t h a t v;hen once acces s of, or i n t e r c o u r s e by, the husband i s 
proved, no evidence w i l l be allowed t o prove t h a t the ch i ld i s 
not the ch i ld of husband, and i s to say , the presumption to be 
drawn becomes an i r r e b u t a b l e one. 
The presumption of l e g i t i m a c y a r i s i n g i n favour of a ch i ld 
born dur ing t h e cont inuance of a va l id ma r r i age , when the p a r t i e s 
to the marriage could have access to each o t h e r a t any time when 
the p a r t i e s to the marriage could have access t o each other at 
5 0 . Supra n. 4 9 . 
5 1 . Venkateswarlu v . Venkata Ifar^ gjAan. AIR 1953 SO I76. 
5 2 . (1953) P .C. 199. 




time when the c h i l d could have been b e g o t t e n , cannot be 
r e b u t t e d ' 
I t i s to be noted t h a t mere o p p o r t u n i t i e s and hot a c t u a l 
i n t e r c o u r s e are s u f f i c i e n t t o s a t i s f y the ' a c c e s s ' t e s t . The 
xveakness of ' n o n - e x c e s s ' t e a t i s exposed when we consider the 
example of a husband who s u f f e r from spermia and i s , ' t h e r e f o r e , 
not capable of producing a c h i l d . If such husbands wife begots 
a ch i ld from another man, Ind ian Law w i l l even then conc lus ive ly 
presume the husband to be the f a t h e r because he has access to his 
w i f e . ^ ^ 
Kon-Access 
The presumption of l eg i t imacy a r i s i n g in favour of a ch i ld 
born dur ing t h e cont inuance of a va l id mar r i age , when the p a r t i e s 
to the marr iage could have acces s to each o the r a t any time when 
the ch i ld could have been b e g o t t e n , cannot be r e b u t t e d . The 
presumpt ion contemplated under t h i s s e c t i o n i s a conclus ive proof 
of law. I t can be d i sp laced only by proof of non-access . The 
p e r s o n a l l e g i n g i l l e g i t i m a c y must conc lus ive ly e s t a b l i s h tha t the 
husband had no oppor tun i ty of i n t e r c o u r s e with the wife a t the 
time when, acco rd ing to ord inary course of n a t u r e , t h e child 
could have been b e g o t t e n . Non-access may be proved by means of 
such l e g a l evidence as i s admiss ib le to prove a p h y s i c a l f a c t . 
5 4 . Mst. Maina v . Deorao Sona,-|i. 1942 Ihg. 96. 
5 5 . Vidya Sagar , Presumption of Legi t imacy, 1986(3) SCC 111 
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The supreme Court held tha t the law requi res posi t ive 
proof of .non-access ' , a negative f a c t . The mere fac t that the 
p a r t i e s were l iv ing apart in d i f fe ren t house i s insuff ic ient to 
e s t a b l i s h non-access.^^ The non-access has to be proved li.ce 
any other physical f ac t and .ay be establ ished both by direct 
and c i rcumstant ia l evidence of an unambigous charac ter , but 
unless such evidence i s forthcoming, i t wi l l not be possible ^^ 
f o r a court ' t o bel ieve i t to probable tha t there was no access ' , 
in Vasu V. Shanta.^^ was dea l t what cons t i tu te access and 
. o n - a c c e s s . The conclusive presumption of law can be displaced 
by proof of the p a r t i c u l a r fact mentioned in section namely 
•non-access ' between the pa r t i e s to the marriage a t any time 
acc-ording to ordinary course of nature he could have been the 
f a t h e r of the ch i ld ren . Access and non-access only cannote 
ex is tence of opportuni t ies for mari ta l intercourse. ' As special 
p ro t ec t i on is given by law to the s t a tus of legitimacy in India. 
The law i s very s t r i c t regarding the type of the evidence which 
can be l e t to rebut the presumption of legit imacy. Even proof 
that the mother continued adultery with any number of men will 
not be i t s e l f suffice- for proving the i l legi t imacy of the chi ldren. 
The presumption of law of legitimacy of a child wi l l not be l ipht ly 
r e p e l l e d . I t w i l l not be allowed to be broken or shaken by a mere 
56 . Dbedu Sheoram v . Malhanbai, AIR 1966 MP 252. 
57 . Venkatesbwarlu v. Venkata Jferayana. AIR 1954 SC 176. 
58 . 1975 Ker. L.T. 553. 
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balance of p r o b a b i l i t y . The evidence of non-access for the 
purpose of repe l l ing i t must be s t rong, d i s t i n c t , sa t i s fac tory 
and conclusive. The standard of proof in this regard i s 
s i m i l a r to the standard of proof of g u i l t in criminal cases . 
These r igours are j u s t i f i e d by considering of public policy for 
t rue a var ie ty of reasons why a c h i l d ' s s ta tus i s not to be 
t r i f l e d with. The stigma of i l leg i t imacy is very severe and we 
have not any of the protec t ive l e g i s l a t i o n as in England to 
p r o t e c t i l l eg i t ima te chi ldren. 
In Padmanabhan v . Bhurghavi. ^ i t was held tha t the access 
and non-access cannotea only the existence and non-existencc' o' 
opportunity for mari ta l in tercourse , the burden of proving which 
e n t i r e l y rest upon the person disclaiming i t , even when i t is 
shown that the wife i s l iv ing in adultery i t i s insuff ic ient of 
access or non-access. The question of access and non-access 
must be considered with reference to the time, when the child 
has been begotten. As to when a child could have been conceived 
i s a matter which may be decided on the facts and circumstances 
of each case and in the l igh t of common course of events and 
medical p o s s i b i l i t i e s . 
The pr inc ipa l purpose of Section 112 i s to impose the 
burden of proof on those who al lege i l legi t imacy and absence 
of access between married persons. The court sha l l draw the 
59. (1981) Cr i . L . j . 156 a t p . 158. 
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presumption not only on the s a t i s f ac t i on of the condition of 
b i r t h during marriage but a lso on sat isfying i t s e l f that no 
convincing proof of non-access is adduced by other party which 
i s incons is ten t with the hypothesis of legi t imacy. Thus, "the 
i n i t i a l burden of proof l i e s on the party claiming legitimacy 
and that i s discharged by proof of b i r th during the continuance 
of valid wedlock, and no proof of access is requi red . Then the 
burden sh i f t s to the other party and i t i s for him to render 
legitimacy highly improbable by proof of one fac t i . e . non-
access between the par t i es to the marriage. If he succeeds in 
proof of non-access, the presumption ia not drawn a t a l l by 
cou r t . If, on the other hand he f a i l s to discharge th i s 
burden, the court must draw the conclusive presumption of 
legitimacy at th i s stage only and not e a r l i e r . 
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C H A P T E R - I I 
TECHNIQUES OF BLOOD TESTS AM) DM IMPRINT INS 
RELEVAICY OP BLOOD TEST EVIDEI€E IN THE DETERMIMTION 
OF PATERNITY PROCEEDIMGS 
The laws dea l ing with the l ega l presumptions of legi t imac 
and p a t e r n i t y in English I s l amic and Indian Lef^al aygtema are 
l a i d down in d e t a i l , which have been d i scussed in the previous 
c h a p t e r s . The i n t e n t i o n of the l e g i s l a t u r e s and the demand of 
j u s t i c e and t r u t h i s t h a t the f a t h e r of a c h i l d in law s h a l l be 
the same, who i s t he b i o l o g i c a l f a t h e r of t h a t c h i l d , The 
presumptions a r e never f i n a l t r u t h , so every presumption howsoe^ 
s t rong i t may b e . r ebu t t ed T5y any o ther more convincing and dire 
ev idence . The presumptions of legi t imacy and p a t e r n i t y can 
v a l i d l y be r e b u t t e d or co r robo ra t ed by the modern s c i e n t i f i c 
t echn iques s p e c i a l l y those t echn iques which a re being developed 
as branches of s c i ence i . e . pa tho logy , f o r e n s i c and g e n e t i c s . 
These developments can very we l l be used and u t i l i s e d to f l „ , o. 
more s p e c i f i c and r e l i a b l e conc lu s ion . The cons ide rab le a d v a n c 
in the s c i e n c e of bleed grouping has provided the cour t s of i 




paterr:ity arise. It is for the legislature and the oourtssto 
fit and utilize such evidence into the existing legal framework. 
1 
Barbara E. Dodd in his paper describes the scientific 
aspect of paternity testing in terms which will be clear to 
those neither scientist nor blood group specialist and he had 
particularly in mind the legal practitioner, as he has pointed 
out in this paper. 
By the knowledge of manner in which the blood groups are 
inherited (the blood group inheritance obey the Mendalian Laws 
of Inheritance), the disputed paternity can be determined if the 
blood of mother and child and putative father is tested. The 
evidence that is to be found is negative only, that is, that a 
particular child is not produced by a particular father. When 
allegations are made against two different persons, it may be 
possible to exclude one of .them. 
Discussing the question of scope and value of blood group 
tests Modi in his book on Medical Jurisprudence^, states as under: 
"In such cases it cannot be said by the determination of the blood 
groups of the parties concerned that a Particular man is the 
father of a given child; but it may be possible to affirm by a 
process of exclusion that he cannot be the father of the child. 
The importance of this means of establishing non-paternity is 
1. Barbara E. Dodd 'The Scope of Blood Grouping in the Elucida-
tion of Problems of Paternity' ' 
2. 1965 ed. p. 108. 
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obvious and has i t s appl ica t ion in su i t s of maintenance of 
i l l e g i t i m a t e children and in su i t s of null i ty^ alleged adultery 
and black-mai l ing. The blood grouping t e s t a have been accep-
ted as evidence in India , England and other European count r ies . 
As the determination of var ious Rh. aub groups may now be 
car r ied out accurately with the help of an t i se ra which have 
l a t e l y become more r ead i ly ava i l ab le . The t e s t s are l ike ly to 
be less fa l lac ious and acceptable in our courts in India'.' 
3 Taylor has formulated the determination of the blood 
group of the child (the antigens are present at b i r t h ) and the 
alleged parents may provide evidence about the poss ib i l i t y of 
a c e r t a in person being the fa ther of a child, or of deciding, 
when two persons are involved which of the two, if e i the r could 
be the fa ther . For some years now, evidence of (non-accesfi, 
which can not be given by e i the r of the spouses) has been 
provided ind i rec t ly by blood t e s t . 
To a common man i l l eg i t ima te child means a child born 
out of an unlavyful wedlock. S c i e n t i f i c a l l y , father i s the 
person whose sperm has f e r t i l i z e d ovum of c h i l d ' s mother. 
During f e r t i l i z a t i o n both fa the r and mother contributes 23 
chromosomes each. The chromosoms carry genes on them, which 
are responsible for heredi tory t r a i t s . So far raater-nity is 
concerned, i t can be proved by proof of a de l ivery . Scient i f ic 
p r inc ip le s are made use of mainly in disputed p a t e r n i t y . It is 
3 . Taylor, Pr inc ip les and Pract ice of Medical Jurisprudence, 
12th ed . , p . 46. 
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an invariable principle of human biology that blood of a child 
must inherit its characteristics from either of the parents. 
If blood of a child contains constituents which are neither 
available in the husband nor in the wife, paternity of the 
4 
husband becomes doubtful. 
Blood groups can be used aa aid in the elucidation of 
problems of doubtful paternity because they are characters which 
obey Mendalian Laws of Inheritance. Moreover, they can be 
investigated by means of clear-cut objective tests. Blood 
group substances or antigens are situated in the outer envelope 
of the red cells of the blood. Their presence is revealed by a 
clumping or agglutination of the red cells when they are mixed 
v;ith appropriate antisera. The antisera are prepare'd from 
human, or occasionally, animal sources and they contain agglu-
tinating substances called antibodies which will detect the 
corresponding antigen on the red cell. The formations of the 
antigens are controlled by entities called genes which ai-e 
present in the nuclei of all cells of the body. The genes are 
situated on the thread like structure called chromosomes of 
which in man there 23 pairs in each cell. The position occupied 
by a geiie on the chromosome is termed as its locus. Anyone of 
several alternative genes may occupy a particular locus but it 
is not possible for more than one of them at a time to be present 
4. Vidya Sagar, Presumption of Legitimacy, 1986 (3) SCO 11. 
5. Supra n . 1. 
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The genes such as these are termed allalomorphs or a l l e l e s . 
I t i s important to r e a l i s e tha t each parent contr ibutes a 
genes toward a p a r t i c u l a r blood group in a chi ld . If the genes 
contr ibuted in each parent are the same the individual i s said 
to be homozygous for the pa r t i cu l a r gene and, if d i f fers he 
hetrozygous. The considerat ion of a hypothetical blood group 
system may make the pos i t ion c l e a r . Let us suppose tha t there 
are two a l t e rna t ive genes (a l l es ) Y and Z, which occupy a p a r t i -
cu lar locus . Three types of individuals are poss ib le , namely 
homozygous YY, homozygous ZZ, and hetrozygous YZ. In tho 
matting of YY with a YY female, a l l the children must reof;ive 
Y from each parent , and themselves by YY, The appearance Z in 
a ch i l d , providing the mother-child re la t ionsh ip was not in 
doubt, would indicate non-paterni ty . The mating of YY male with 
a YZ female can give r i s e to children of two types . A Y gene 
from the father can pai r with a Y gene from the mother, giving a 
homozygous YY ch i ld , or Y from the fa ther can pa i r with Z from 
the mother giving a hetrozygous YZ ch i l d . The appearance of ZZ 
child would again indicate non-paternity since a YY fa ther 
can only give Y to his off -spr ing. 
A study of blood group in many thousands of families has 
j u s t i f i e d the confidence in the above statements, which can be 
condensed into the following two laws of inheri tance ; 
1 . A blood group gene cannot appear in a child unless present 
m one or other (or both) pa ren t s . 
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2. If an individual is homozygous for a blood group gene, it 
must appear in the blood of all his children. 
The "blood groups systems listed in table 1 are those in 
the current use in the investigation of the cases of doubtful 
paternity. Naturally the greater the number of groups included 
in the tests, the greater the chance of revealing non-paternity, 
if this is the true situation. The first eight systems mentioned 
in table 1 are systems in which the end product of the genes 
are the antigens on on the red cell surface. These give a 
combined chance of making of exclusion of about 60 per cent. 
The most recent systems have not been the systems of genes given 
rise to antigen on the red cell, but genetically controlled 
serum componants, Gm, heptoglobin and Gc groups. The combined 
exclusion rate, if these tests.are used is raised from 60 per 
cent to 72 per cent. There ig no doubt that other systems \^ ill 
be gradually added to these. In fact phosphogluco mutame (PGM), 
a red cell enzyme is already began to be used. Most of the 
groups are independent to each other and are based on different 
chromosomes. 
The recently developed human luecocytes antigine (HLA) 
system alone is capable of demonstrating non-paternity in 90 per 
cent of cases but in combination of other grouping system it can 
raise 'non-father' exclusion upto 98 per cent .6 
^' ^fno^"?'^ ^ ^^^ ^°°^ °^  Medical Jurisprudence and Texicology I19S5;, p. 602. 
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Table-1. - Blood group avatems uaed in oases of doubtful 
"Paterni ty 
Name of System Red c e l l an t i gen or serum 
^ ^ f a c t o r s t e s t e d fo r 
ABO A, A2 , B and 0 
MIBs M, N, S ( S ) 
Rh D, C , E , C, C ^ , e 
Duffy Fy^ (I'y^) 
Kidd (Jk^) (Jk^) 
Lutheren (Lu^) (Lu ) 
K e l l K (k) 
P P-, 
1 2 
Haptoglobins Hp and Hp 
Gm Gm 
Gc Gc'' and Gc^ 
Ho-wever, an i n v e s t i g a t i o n -which does not include ABO, 
MNS, Rh (D,C,E,e ,G^,e) and a t l e a s t t h r e e or four of the o ther 
systems cannot be cons idered a d e q u a t e ) . 
D i f f e r e n t blood group systems may be discussed sepa ra t e ly 
i n somewhat d e t a i l — 
Blood grouping baaed on Red c e l l Antigens -
Depending upon t,he v a r i o u s types of red c e l l an t igens 
and t h e i r h e r e d i t o r y t r ansmis s ion blood groups are c l a s s i f i e d 
i n t o mainly t h r e e most important systems i . e . ABO, MN and Rh 
s y s t e m s . The red c e l l a n t i g e n s are i d e n t i f i e d by simple 
7 . The scope of blood grouping in the e l u c i d a t i o n of problems 
of p a t e r n i t y - Barbara E. Dodd, Medicine Science and Law, 
1969. 
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Objective t e s t s . A person ' s red ce l l s are mixed with antiserum 
specified for a given blood group an t igens . If the red cel ls 
containa the an t igens , they are agglutinoted by the antiserum. 
The antigen present on the red be l l s and belonging to one and 
the same blood group system are determined by a pa i r of genes, 
are inher i ted from the mother, and the other from the fa ther . 
For some groups, t h e i r t es t ing sera that identify the products 
of both genes, and in t h i s case the f u l l composition of the 
pe r son ' s blood group and his genotype can be determined. Where 
a n t i s e r a are avai lable for only one of the pa i r s of the genes, 
the phenotype alone can be ident i f ied i . e . the t e s t w i l l not 
d i s t i ngu i sh between individual homozygous for the detectable 
products of the genes and hetrozygous individuals who have 
inher i ted the detectable genes from one parent and non-detectable 
from the other one. Thus, for such groups, there are only 
d is t inguishable phenolypic c l a s se s , the posi t ive who have 
de tec table gene group products, and the negative who have not. 
In such instance the genotypes of individuals can be deduced 
from family s tud ies , when the blood group of at l eas t two 
generat ions are known. 
ABO System 
/ "^^ 6 -^0 system divide mankind in to four main blood groups 
as defined by by the presence or absence in the RBC or individuals; 
of two specific agglutinable substances known as A and B. The 
carpuscles of group A contains A agglutinogen; those of group B, 
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B a g g l u t i n o g e n ; those of group AB con ta ins both A and B a g g l u t i -
nogens , while those of group 0 con t a in s n e i t h e r A nor B. I t in 
now known t h a t t h e r e are two important A sub-groups , namely A am 
Ap. These a re a l s o found in group AB g iv ing r i s e t o sub-f^roup 
A,B and A^B. 
i ) Agglutinogen A or B cannot appear in the ch i l d unless i t i s 
p r e sen t in one or both p a r e n t s . 
i i ) Agglutinogen A, cannot appear in the c h i l d un l e s s i t i s 
p resen t in one or both p a r e n t s . 
i i i ) An 0 pa r en t cannot have an AB ch i ld an AB an 0 c h i l d . 
i v ) If two p a r e n t s a re of t h e genotype AO and AO, a child 00 
may be born . 
v) P a r e n t s of AA or AO genotype may have an A c h i l d , and 
v i ) The combination of AB parent with Ap ch i ld and v i ce -vo r sa 
cannot occur . The g e n e t i c a l law governing i nhe r i t ancp of 
ABC blood groups a re i l l u s t r a t e d in Table number 2 . 
MK System 
In a d d i t i o n to the ABO system of blood groups other 
agg lu t inogenes M and N e x i s t in RBC. Human blood can t h u s , be 
d iv ided i n t o t y p e s , M, N and MN. In type M, the RBC possesyos 
the agg lu t inogen M but not N. In type N the agglut inogen N is 
p r e s e n t but not M. In MN type blood p o s s e s s e s both M and N 
a g g l u t i n o g e n . 
i ) Agglutinogen M or N always appear i n the blood of chi ld 
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i i ) Both M p a r e n t s cannot have and N chi ld and v i c e - v e r s a . 
i i i ) In raatin=r,s where both p a r e n t s a r e e i t h e r type of M or K 
the chi ld always of the same type as the pa ren t -
i v ) In the mating where one pa ren t i s type M, and o the r type A', 
the ch i l d r en a re type MN. 
v) In the mating where one pa ren t i s homozygous (M or K) and 
o the r he t rozygous (MN), a l l c h i l d r e n are of p a r e n t a l typo 
in a 50 t o 50 r a t i o , and 
v i ) In mating where the parents a re both MN c h i l d r e n are th ree 
types p o s s i b l e . 
B. Supra n . 6 , p . 6 00 
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Table -3 ; I n h e r i t a n c e of MN, blood groupa 
Blood 
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Another blood group system, independent of ABO and MN 
blood g roups , i s c a l l ed the Rh blood group sys tem. The Rh 
system i s c h a r a c t e r i s e d by a s e t of a n t i g e n e s , determined by a 
s e r i e s of a l l e l i e g e n e s , and i d e n t i f i e d by symbols ; R^,Rp,H. , 
Rg, r ' , r ' • , r ^ , r . By permuta t ion and combination of these 
a l l e l e s the re v a r i o u s blood groups in t h i s sys tem. 
i ) '^h nega t ive p a r e n t s cannot produce an Rh p o s i t i v e ch i ld , and 
i i ) Rh p o s i t i v e homozygous p a r e n t s cannot produce Rh negat ive 
ch i ld ren v/hile Rh p o s i t i v e homozygous p a r e n t s can produce 
Rh p o s i t i v e and Rh nega t ive c h i l d r e n . 
A t y p i c a l p r o t o c o l of r e s u l t s in a case in which there 
was an exc lus ion of p a t e r n i t y i s shown in t a b l e 5 and considered 
9 . Id . a t p . 601 . 
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Table-4 ^ D i s t r i b u t i o n Peroentafie of Expected Frequencies of 
d i f f e r e n t Blood-igrouP Sva'tems f o r t y p i c a l Indian 








2 2 . 0 
M 
3 9 . 5 7 
4 5 . 6 1 
( 1 - 2 ) 
5 2 . 3 7 
1 
4 4 . 3 0 
A 
7 . 5 0 
B 
3 3 . 0 
4 6 . 6 7 
R^  Rg R^r 
11 ,84 31 .77 
( 1 - 2 ) 
17 .2 4 
2 -1 
4 0 . 5 1 
BA 
2 8 . 7 5 
AB 0 
5 . 0 4 0 . 0 
N 
13 .76 
Rgr r r R^R^ 
4 .16 5 . 84 2 . 1 0 
( - 1 , - 2 ) 













1 2 - 1 2 
4 . 3 5 48.91 46 
1 2-1 2 
63.1 32.1 4.2 
1 2-1 2 
75.31 22.68 2.05 
1 2-1 2 
80.69 17.78 1.53 
below : 
Of Cases t e s t e d in the Department of Porens ic Medlolne 
a t t he London H o s p i t a l , about one in f i n e r e s u l t s in an exclus ion 
of the p a t e r n i t y of t h e f a t h e r . This i s , of course , doea not 
10. Supra n . 6 
57 
mean that the 'non-fa ther ' r a t e ia one in f i v e . Not only as 
discussed e a r l i e r i t i s not possible to de tec t a l l non-fathers 
by means of blood groups, but there i s considerable pr ior 
s e l ec t ion of cases submitted for t e s t i n g . 
So f a r we have been considering the scope of blood 
grouping t e s t in es tab l i sh ing non-paterni ty . Proof of paterni ty 
( i . e . determining tha t only one pa r t i cu l a r man can be the 
f a t h e r of a pa r t i cu l a r ch i ld ) ia, a t l eas t at the present time, 
based on mathematical p r o b a b i l i t y . The usual procedure is aa 
follows : If af ter completion of a blood group invest igat ion 
upon pu ta t ive fa ther , mother and child no exclusion of paterni ty 
i s ev ident , the blood group genes which must be of paternal 
or igin are noted. The chance of putat ive fa the r has of paorjing 
on these genes a l l togehter in one single sperm (since they are 
independent of each other) i s compared with the chance of obtain-
ing such a sperm from a man in the random pollut ion ( for if the 
pu ta t ive father i s not the true f a the r , he i s randomly selected 
man from the blood group point of view). 
A whole range of r e su l t s i s obtained. If in , t e s t ing a 
family, only common blood group combinations are encountered, 
or if only one or two genes are known with ce r t a in i ty to originate 
from the fa ther , the odds in favour of paterni ty would not be 
s i g n i f i c a n t . The s t a t i s t i c a l s ignif icance begins a t the 19 to 
1 l e v e l . 
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As more and more genet ica l ly controlled characters are 
added to the l i s t of those applied to the pa terni ty problemo, 
so the number of genes knov/n to be of paternal or igin v/i]l 
increase and the adds in favour of the putat ive fa ther being 
the true fa ther , if he possesses them, w i l l increase too . 
Table 5 presents the r e s u l t s of an ac tual case . It is 
of i n t e r e s t to note tha t two putative f a the r s were t e s t e d . One 
of them c lea r ly excluded from paterni ty of his wife 's child on 
two independent systems, Kell (K) and MN. He cannot contribute 
e i t h e r N or K, both of which have to be genes of paternal origin 
(as the wife lacks them). The t o t a l number of known antigens 
possessed by the child and absent from the mother which must 
t he r e fo re , be of pa ternal origin for four, A^, N, G and K. In 
addi t ion i t is known that the father must contribute haptoglo-
bin 2 since the child i s homozygous for t h i s gene. It must be 
appreciated that if the child has a blood group gene which i s 
present a l so in mother, i t w i l l not be known (unless the mother 
is homozygous for the p a r t i c u l a r gene) whether the gene in child 
i s of maternal origin or pa t e rna l . In the case shown in table 5 
the S gene i s an example. Both mother and child have S and 
the re fo re , the S gene could be of maternal origin but equally i t 
could be of paternal o r ig in , thus, i t is not possible to inclu'le 
the S gene in the ca lcu la t ion for probable pa t e rn i t y . 
Mr. R has the genes A^  , N,C and K and i t i s possible to 
workout mathematically his -chance of contr ibut ing a combination 
59 
of a l l fou r of these in a s i n g l e sperm. By re fe rence to the 
d e s c r i p t i o n of the h y p o t h e t i c a l blood group system, YZ given 
e a r l i e r i t can be seen t h a t if he i s homozygous for a p a r t i c u l a r 
gene h is chance of pass ing i t on to o f f - s p r i n g is 100. (or 1) 
and if he t rozygous , 50 pe r cent (or 0 . 5 ) . Therefore , if a 
number of c h a r a c t e r s ( in t h i s example f i v e ) have to be c o n s i -
d e r e d , h i s chance of pa s s ing on a l l f i v e i s a r r ived at by 
m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of the i n d i v i d u a l , chances of which, in t h i s 
case i s 0.5 XI s ince he i s hetrozygous f o r fou r of the blood 
groups genes and homozygous fo r one of them. Where homozyr^e-
s i t y or h e t r o z y g o s i t y cannot be determined from the t e s t s , i t 
i s considered f a i r t o regard him as hetrozygous f o r tha t p a r t i -
c u l a r gene . In t h i s p a r t i c u l a r ins tance i t i s not known 
whether Mr. R, i s AA or AO. 
As mentioned above, the f i g u r e obtained f o r of Mr. H's 
chance of c o n t r i b u t i n g the necessa ry c h a r a c t e r s haw to tao r e l a t e d 
to the chances of obta in ing such a sperm from the random [i;ale 
p o p u l a t i o n . This f i gu re is obta ined by m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of the 
known genes f r e q u e n c i e s in the popula t ion of r e l e v a n t c h a r a c t e r s , 
e . g . A^  (0 .21) X N(0.46) X C(0.4) X XP^(o.58) K(0 .05) . The 
balance of p r o b a b i l i t i e s world out 60 to 1 in favour of a :3])erm 
from Mr. R. In the l i g h t of the above d i s c u s s i o n i t i s c r y s t a l 
c l e a r t h a t the mathematical p r o b a b i l i t y based on these c a l c u l a -
t i o n s , not in the s t r i c t s e n s e , a p r o b a b i l i t y of p a t e r n i t y of 
the a l l eged f a t h e r . I t i s r a t h e r the chance the named naraa 
has of producing a sperm with the r e q u i s i t e c h a r a c t e r s compared 
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with the chance of obtaining a su i tab le sperm from the random 
populat ion; since if the putat ive fa ther is not the t rue father 
he i s , as far as blood groups are concerned, randomly selected. 
Table-^"*"" '• Family shov;inp: an exclusion of paterni ty of one 
putat ive fa ther CMr w; and a s ignif icant proba-
b i l i t y of paterni ty of the other (Mr.H) 
Rh 
L 
Name ABO HNS D E iV/ K Ky' 
M r . R 
r 4 r . W 

































In India , the Madras High Court has directed the par t ies 
for blood t e s t . Jus t ice T.S. Arunachalam sought the sc i en t i f i c 
opinion of the State Forensic Science Department and also the 
Post-graduate I n s t i t u t e of Basic Medical Sciences, Taraman.l, 
to decide on the paterni ty d i spu te , the f i r s t of i t s kind in 
recent time in India . 
The Disputed Paterni ty Centre , the f i r s t and only 
Centre of i t s kind in the country, was established aa the 
Department in 1985, following the decis ion taken in the f i r s t 
na t iona l seminar on Disputed Paterni ty and Surrogate Motherfiood, 
11 . Medicine Science and Law, 1969, p . 58. 
61 
conducted in Madras by the Forensic Science Society of India of 
v^hich Prof. Chandrasekaran is the Pres ident . Prof. Chandrn-
sekaran said "we t e s t about ten systems". The deciding factor 
was the SLA typing of blood. The population could be dividing 
in to 300 million groups and if a l l these t e s t s were conducte.1, 
i t almost reaches ind iv idua l i sa t ion of blood. In these instan-
c e s , he sa id , "V/e can say cent per cent whether a pa r t i cu l a r 
child i s not a child of 'X' and 'Y' but we caJi say that 99.9 
per cent that the child is born to a person. Referring to 
the disputed pa te rn i ty case of Mary, Prof, Chandrasekaran 
s ta ted that eight persons in a l l were tes ted and they were the 
Adiveerarama Pandian - Kanniammal and Perumal and Kaliamraal 
Couples, t h e i r three children besides the disputed Mary. We 
then found that the f i r s t couple was not the b io log ica l parents 
and the l a t t e r , Perumal and Kaliammal, were 99*9 per cent the 
r ea l pa ren t s . The t e s t s tha t took nearly three weeks to 
determine the paterni ty were r a the r cost ly - Rs. 3,000 for 
four persons he sa id . 
The Post-graduate I n s t i t u t e for Basic Medical Sciences, 
Taramani, a l so submitted i t s report to the Madras High Court 
to determine the pa te rn i ty of Mary, and Prof. T.N, Gopinath 
of the Genetics Department of I n s t i t u t e told th i s correspondent 
tha t "we suggested to the court that from our t e s t s i t may not 
be possible to completely rule out e i t h e r of the couple aa 
p a r e n t s " . Therefore, he conceded that i t was only by the 
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t e chn ique used by the Forens ic Science Labora tory , i t was 
12 p o s s i b l e to determine the r e a l p a r e n t s " . 
In Dr. (Mrs.) B h a r t i Ha.i v . Sumesh Saohdeo. -' the medical 
r e p o r t of the ch i ld as w e l l as t h e family members of both the 
c l a i m e n t s , d e c l a r i n g t h a t the p e t i t i o n e r s , Mr. Baldeo Raj and 
h is wife Dr. (Mrs.) B h a r t i Ra j , are excluded as the r e a l p a r e n t s 
of the d i spu t ed c h i l d , Ifeel Goomer. The r e p o r t says ' i t i s most 
l i k e l y t h a t Mr. Sumesh Sachdeo and his wi fe , Mrs. Alka Sachdeo, 
a re the r e a l p a r e n t s of Neel Goomer. The medical r e p o r t was 
p laced before Mr. J u s t i c e M,L. Bhat of the Allahabad High Court , 
h i s Lordship ordered t h a t the medical r e p o r t submitted by the 
A l l - I n d i a I n s t i t u t e of Medical Sc iences , New D e l h i , where the 
blood t e s t was conducted be placed on record and t h a t the case 
l i s t e d on February 5 , 1991. 
L a s t l y , i t i s c l e a r t h a t i n 99.99^ cases cour t s can r e l i e d 
upon the blood t e s t in d i spu ted c a s e s . In ano the r words, the 
blood t e s t i s one of the methods t o determine the p a t e r n i t y 
and in 9 9 . 9 ^ cases the blood t e s t i s r e l i a b l e ev idence . 
DNA IMPRIUTIMT, A CONCLUSIVE TEST TO DETERMINE THE PATERNITY 
In America and Europe i t has long been the ambit ion of 
the F o r e n s i c S c i e n t i s t s t o be ab le to i d e n t i f y the r e a l b i o l o g i c a l 
12. C.S. Jayaram, The Hindustan Times, dated June 4 , 1989. 
13 . Report (UNI), The Times of Ind ia , January 12, 1991. 
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fa ther in the cases of i)aternlty disputes and to s e t t l e the 
cases of doubtful pa tern i ty with absolute c e r t a i n t y . The 
a r r i v a l of DM f inger p r in t ing - pa r t i cu l a r l y as developed by 
Alee Jef fer rys and colleagues a t Leicester University is a 
b ig step towards a forensic s c i e n t i s t ' s goal in t h i s area . 
The nunfirous blood-group polymorphism tha t are currently 
applied to cases of doubtful parentage (usually doubtful 
p a t e r n i t y ) already go far towards excluding everyman wrongly 
named as f a the r of the ch i ld . Exclusion of pa te rn i ty estab-
l i shed by showing the absence in the putat ive fa ther of one 
or more blood-group gene products , which, in the child are 
seen to be pa te rna l ly i nhe r i t ed . A range of polymorphic 
systems are invest igated independtly of each other by re la t ive ly 
simple procedure in which the gene products are disclosed by 
agg lu t ina t ion . The t ab l e no. 5 in the previous chapter shows 
t h a t how a combination of polymorphism can approach the ab i l i t y 
to exclude a l l f a l s e f a the r s . Moreover^ the calculated proba-
b i l i t y of pa te rn i ty fo r excluded man, v i r t u a l l y a l l of whom 
w i l l be t rue f a t h e r s , i s l ikely to be s ign i f i can t ly in favour 
i A 
of t h e i r p a t e r n i t y . 
Even so DHA f inger pr in t ing with the probes developed 
by Jeffereys has the p o t e n t i a l to exceed the efficiency of 
conventional systems because there are good grounds for an t i -
c i p a t i n g that de f in i t e answers not only those, excluding 
p a t e r n i t y but also for pinpointing the t rue fa the r , w i l l be 
14. Kature, v o l . 318, dated 12th December, 1985. 
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obtained in every case . But i t i s in resolving problems of 
family re la t ionsh ip in which putat ive parents are closely 
r e l a t ed to each other tha t DM f inge r -p r in t ing has pa r t i cu l a r 
15 advantages over p resen t ly use4 system. 
The gene i s the unite of i nhe r i t ance . Genes are made 
of deoxiribonulic acid (DM). DM polemers are d i f feren-
t i a b l e not on the bas is of physical or chemical proper t ies of 
molecular s i z e , geometry or subs t i tuent groups, but r a the r by 
d i f fe rence in information contents ( i . e . genetic code) . The 
gene t i c imprint i s a bas is of criminal inves t iga t ion , and in 
16 
so lv ing disputed questions of p a t e r n i t y . 
The iden t i f i ca t i on of a l iv ing being presupposes tha t 
he must be different from every l iv ing being. All l iv ing beings 
of the same species are genet ica l ly quite d i f ferent from one 
another except for i den t i ca l twins. The usual t es t to determine 
the blood group, Rh fac to r and other maker in the blood did not 
provide any conclusive evidence as to whether the child was the 
son or nephew of the lady who claimed to be his mother. Only 
the d i rec t analysis of the genet ic information in the DM 
molecules of both these individuals could es tabl ish the i r 
r e l a t i o n s h i p without any ambiguity. ' 
15. Supra n. 14. 
16. Fool Proof Test, by Sar la R. Gupta, Lex Et J u r i s , 
Vol. 3 , July 1988, p . 50. 
17. I b i d . 
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In 1935, a Ghanaian boy born in the U.K., immigrated to 
j o i n h i s f a t h e r in Ghana, b u t , subsequen t ly , he decided to 
r e t u r n t o the U.K. to j o i n h i s mother and family members. 
Immigration a u t h o r i t i e s , however, suspected t h a t a s u b s t i t u t i o n 
had been made as the woman had seve ra l s i s t e r s l i v i n g in Ghana 
and they f e l t t h a t one of t h e i r sons had re tu rned i n s t e a d . The 
u sua l t e s t s t o determine t h e blood g roups , Rh f a c t o r and o ther 
makers in t h e blood did not provide any conclus ive evidence aa 
to whether he was the son or nephew of t h e lady who claimed to 
1R be his mother . The Immigration a u t h o r i t i e s of the U.K. 
e n t r u s t e d the work of g e n e t i c impr in t ing to Alec J e f f e r y s of 
L i e c e s t e r Univers i ty who had developed t h i s technique of DM 
f i n g e r - p r i n t i n g . In t h i s case J e f f e r y s had taken blood samples 
from the mother, the boy, b i s b r o t h e r and h i s two s i s t e r s . He 
p repa red DM impr in ts from these s a n p l e s . The mother d isplayed 
about 80 bands r e p r e s e n t i n g 80 f ragments . He, then found out 
how many of these fragments the t h r e e c h i l d r e n sha red . He found 
t h a t those gragments which did not match with d isputed boy, 
obv ious ly came from the f a t h e r . He a lso found t h a t there were 
39 p a t e r n a l fragments among the t h r e e c h i l d r e n . He found t h a t 
20 fragments out of 39 were found in the DM f i n g e r - p r i n t s of 
the d isputed boy. He found t h a t the boy had 40 o ther fragments 
which t a l l i e d with the mother . Thus, he concluded t h a t in a l l 
p r o b a b i l i t y the boy was the woman's son beyond any reasonable 
doubt.""^ 
1 8 . Lex Et J u r i s . , July 1988, p . 50 
19. I b i d . 
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New S c i e n t i s t , U.K., July 23, 1987 issue at page 30, 
g ives d e t a i l s of DM f inge r -p r in t ing as under -
"In genet ic f i nge r -p r in t ing , s c i e n t i s t extracted genetic 
ma te r i a l , DM from the sample of blood. They add enzymes to 
the DM tha t chop i t into t iny pieces of unequal s i ze s . They 
then put the fragments into a gel and an e l e c t r i c f ield sepa-
r a t e s the l a rge r DM fragments from the smaller ones. The 
s c i e n t i s t then transferred the DNA from the gel to a nylone 
membrane by a process cal led 'souther b l o t t i n g ' - the fragments 
of DM move from the gel to the membrane as the solution of DM 
i s drawn up by capi l lary forces created by b l o t t i n g paper placed 
on top of the nylone membrane. The posi t ion of DM fragments in 
the nylone membrane exactly matches t h e i r pos i t ion in the ge l . " 
The next step is to add tiny pieces of DM that are 
r ad ioac t ive ly l abe l l ed . The DM probes are b u i l t to identify 
regions of DM, known as hypervariables. Alec Jeffery of 
the University of Leices ter found that peoples are unique in 
terms of d i s t r i bu t ion of hypervariables in t h e i r DM. A child 
w i l l share some of his hypervariables with his biological mother 
and some with i t s b io logica l f a the r . 
After washing the nylone membrane, the only rad ioac t iv i ty 
l e f t w i l l be the probes that have stuck to hypovariable regions. 
Put the membrane next to an X^ray film and dark bands w i l l 
appear where the probe have stuck to these regions. The 
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d i s t r i b u t i o n of the^ bands is_unique to an individual and a 
^ i l d ' 3 ' gene t ic f i n g e r - p r i n t s ' v;ill be an amalgacnation of 
f i n g e r - p r i n t s of i t s two pa ren t s . 
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C H A P T E R - I I I 
POWER OF THE COURT TO ORDER 
• BLOOD TEST 
PART-A : EICLISH SYSTEM 
The B r i t i s h Courts have recognised t h a t the l i b e r t y of 
t h e sub jec t cannot be in f r inged except under the due process 
of lav;, and t h a t t h e p r i v i l e g e s a g a i n s t s e l f - i n c r i m i n a t i o n , 
and a g a i n s t unreasonable search and s e i z u r e s , a re pro tec ted by 
t h e law un les s t h e r e i s s p e c i f i c s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n s denying 
t h e s e p r i v i l e g e s in p a r t i c u l a r c i r cums tances . 
The B r i t i s h C o n s t i t u t i o n d'oea not c o n t a i n s p e c i f i c 
p r o v i s i o n s d e a l i n g with the above sa id p r i v i l e g e s . But the 
American C o n s t i t u t i o n do have the s p e c i f i c p r o v i s i o n s 
g u a r a n t e e i n g the p r i v i l e g e s i . e . in Amendment XIV, Amendment V 
and Amendment IV. But England has a h i s t o r y of p r i v i l e g e s upon 
which the e x i s t i n g super s t r u c t u r e of English j u s t i c e i s based. 
Now the important q u e s t i o n i s whether the cour t has power to 
o r d e r the compulsory blood t e s t s , which v i o l a t e the p r i v i l e g e s 
a g a i n s t s e l f i n c r i m i n a t i o n , unreasonable search and s e i z u r e ? 
In t h i s regard Wigmore has made a s i g n i f i c a n t obse rva t ion and 
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said t ha t : 
"Looking back a t the history of p r iv i lege and the s p i r i t 
of s t ruggle by which i t s establishment came about the object of 
the p ro tec t ion seems p l a i n . It is the employment of legal 
p rocess to ext rac t from the person's own l ips and admiBsion of 
h is g u i l t , which w i l l , t hus , take the place of other evidence 
such was the process of acoe l e s i a s t i ca l cour t , as approved 
through two cen tu r i e s , i n q u i s i t o r i a l method of put t ing the 
accused upon his oath in order to supply the lack of the 
required two witnesses . Such was the complaint of l iburn and 
h i s fellow objectors , t h a t accused ought to be convicted by the 
other evidence and not by own forced confession upon oath. 
Such, too , i s the inference from the policy of the 
p r i v i l e g e as a defensible i n s t i t u t i o n . . . . t ha t i s to say, i t 
e x i s t mainly in order to stimulate prosecution to a fu l l and 
f a i r search for evidence procurable by t h e i r own exert ion, and 
to deter them from a lazy and pernicious re l iance upon the 
accused's testimony extracted by force of law. 
Such f i n a l l y , is a p r a c t i c a l requirement tha t follows 
from the necess i ty of recognising other unquestioned methods 
of procuring evidence, for if the pr iv i lege extended beyond 
these l i m i t s , and protected an accused otherwise than in bis 
s t r i c t l y tes t imonial s t a t u s , if , in other words, i t created 
i n v i a b i l i t y not only for his physical control of his own vocal 
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u t t e r a n c e s , but a lso for his pbysloal control in whatever 
from exero iae , than i t would be possible for a gui l ty person 
to shut himself up in his house, with a l l the tools and 
i n d i c i a of his crime, and the authori ty of the two employees 
in evidence anything tha t might be obtained by forcibly over 
throwing possession and compelling the surrender of the ev i -
d e n t i a l a r t i c l e s , a c l ea r reduction and absurdum. 
In other words i t i s not merely any and every compul-
s ion" tha t i s the kernel of the p r i v i l e g e , in history and in 
the cons t i t u t i ona l de f in i t i ons but tes t imonia l compulsion. 
The one idea i s as e s s e n t i a l as o ther . The general p r i nc ip l e , 
t he re fo re , in regard to form the protected disc losure , may be 
said to be t h i s : the p r iv i lege protec t a person from any 
d i s c l o s e r sought by legal process against him as a wi tness" . 
"If an accused person were to refuse to be removed from 
the j a i l to court room for t r i a l claiming tha t he was p r i v i -
leged not to expose his f ea tu res to the witnesses for i den t i -
f i c a t i o n , i t i s not d i f f i c u l t to conceive the j ud i c i a l 
deception which would be given to such a claim. And yet no 
l e s s a claim is the log ica l consequence of the argument that 
has been frequently offered and occasionally sanctioned in 
applying the pr ivi lege t o proof of the bodily features of the 
accused. 
The l imi t of the pr iv i lege is a p la in one, ^rora the 
general p r inc ip le . . . . i t r e s u l t s that an inspection of bodily 
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fea ture by the t r ibuna l or by the witnesaea cannot v io la te 
the p r i v i l e g e , because i t does not c a l l upon the accused as 
a wi tness , i . e . , upon his test imonial r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . That 
he may in such cases be required some time to exercise muscular 
ac t ion - as when he i s required to take off h is shows or r o l l 
up his sleeve - immaterial , unless a l l bodily action were 
synonimous with tes t imonia l u t terance; fo r , as already observed 
. . . . not compulsion alone i s the component idea of the p r iv i l ege , 
but t e s t imonia l compulsion. Vflaat i s obtained from the accused 
by such ac t ion is not testimony about bis body, but his body, 
i t s e l f . . . . unless same attempt is made to secure a communica-
t i o n , wr i t t en or o r a l , upon which re l iance is to be placed as 
involving his consciousness of the f ac t s and operations of his 
mind in expressing i t , the demand made upon him is not a t e s t i -
monial one. Moreover, the main object of the privi lege i s to 
force prosecuting of f icers to go out and search and obtained 
a l l e x t r i n s i c available evidence of an offence with relying 
upon the accused 's admission. Now in the case of the persons 
body, i t marks and t r a i t s , i t s e l f is the main evidence; there 
i s o rd ina r i ly no other or b e t t e r evidence avai lable for 
Prosecutor . Hence, the main reason for the pr iv i lege looses 
i t s f o r c e . The provision against self incrimination (Protection 
of pr iv i lege) has been held to be subject to the following 
l i m i t a t i o n . 
1. Wigmore on Evidence, Third Edi t ion, Volume VIII (s.2263) 
at pp 362-363. 
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(a) I t is open to the accused to waive the p r i v i l e g e . But 
if he v/aivea the pr iv i lege and gives testimony on any 
poin t , he must give the whole of i t . 
(b) Where an accused has been pardoned or otherwise given 
immunity from proaeoutlon, he may "be compelled to give 
evidence. But before the accused may be so compelled, 
he must be given complete immunity. 
(c) The immunity ia merely from giving evidence against the 
consent of the accused. The prosecution not debarred 
from exhib i t ing the person of the accused to the Jury, 
comparing t h i s f i n g e r - p r i n t s , photographs e t c . Ifcr does 
the immunity prevent production of testimony that blood 
was discovered on the body of accused a f t e r alleged 
crime or marks and bruises were found upon accused's 
body, and accused's s h i r t being taken off h is body. 
The pe rmi s s ib i l i t y of i den t i f i ca t i on by f inger , palm, 
f o o t - p r i n t s and the taking of accuded's p ic tu re a f t e r a r r e s t , 
blood and urine t e s t , use of emetice stomach pump or similar 
device for ex t rac t ing ornaments swelled e t c . , requir ing suspect 
or accused t o wear or t ry ing on p a r t i c u l a r apparine or requir ing 
defendant in criminal case to exhib i t himself or perform physical 
a c t during t r i a l and in the presence of jury are not hi t by the 
immunity conferred by the provisions of self incr iminat ion. I t 
' i s c lear tha t the accused cannot be compelled to produce any 
I 
I evidence against himself, such evidence can be taken or seized 
provided of course , such taking or seizure is lega l ly permissible 
The three things are necessary to cons t i tu te the requi re-
ments of the provisions of- rule against self incr iminat ion. 
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( i ) An accused person, 
( i i ) his being compelled to be a witness and, 
( i i i ) such compulsion being against himself 
The p roh ib i t ion operates only when an accused is sought to be 
forced to depose agains t h is innocence. 
Bearing these p r inc ip l e s in mind, the compulsory direction 
K 
by the court in a pa t e rn i ty proceeding to the defendant to give 
h i s blood for blood t e s t being made and can be supported in 
p a t e r n i t y disputed cases. Lacking l e g i s l a t i o n , the courts 
have not found i t easy to f i t blood tes t s evidence into the 
e x i s t i n g lega l framework and the process of doing so is s t i l l 
incomplete. The use of blood t e s t s to determine the ch i ld ' s 
p a t e r n i t y has inevi tably given r i s e to conf l ic t between the 
cour t s desire to ac t in the best i n t e r e s t of the chi ld , and 
i t s in tent ion to ensure that j u s t i c e i s done. In th i s regard 
judic iary had played a v i t a l ro le and despite of the non-
a v a i l a b i l i t y of s ta tu tory provisions the court had ordered for 
blood t es t in disputed pa te rn i ty cases . In some cases the 
cour t had order for blood t e s t but in other s imi la r cases the 
court had refused to allow the blood t e s t . 
The chronology of j u d i c i a l pronouncements i s re f lec t ing 
a systematic p i c tu re that how the law developed by the courts 
in th i s r e spec t . In W. v. W^ ^ the husband was pe t i t ion ing to 
2 . Med. S c i . & Law, 1969 p . 5 3 . 
3. The Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 87 p. 86. 
4. (1964) p. 67. 
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have the marriage annulled on the ground tha t his wife was 
pregnant "by another man a t the commencement of the marriage. 
The wife refused blood t e s t s for herself and the child a l s o . 
Cairus J . decided he had no power under any statute, or ru l e of 
court to order the wife ' s or the c h i l d ' s blood to be t e s t e d ; 
and said a court of appeal affirming him, nei ther had the court 
any inherent power to do so , since the old a c c l e s i a s t i c a l court, 
from whom the modern ^jurisdiction i s i nhe r i t ed , had no such 
5 
power. Similar ly , in Holmes v . Holmes, case ra is ing a dispute 
as to p a t e r n i t y . The wife allowed the c h i l d ' s blood to be 
t e s t ed before the o f f i c i a l s o l i c i t o r , who interviews in such 
cases to safeguard the i n t e r e s t of the ch i ld , had time to 
objec t . The blood group showed that the husband could not be 
the f a the r , therefore , proved adul te ry . In a now celebrated 
dictum Omrod J . , pointed out the in jus t ice t ha t would have 
resul ted from a successful object ion. 
" . . . . had d i f f i c u l t i e s being put in the way of the 
c h i l d ' s blood being taken, i t i s manifest on the facts of this 
case t h a t a grave i n ju s t i c e might have been done. I t would 
have been v i r t u a l l y impossible upon the evidence, I th ink , for 
t h i s man to es tab l i sh t ha t he was no, prima fac ie , the father 
of t h i s child . . . . I should myself g rea t ly hope tha t no difficul-
t i e s wi l l ever be put in the way of a c h i l d ' s blood being 
supplied for blood grouping . , . . there i s nothing more shocking 
5 . (1966) 1 All .E.R. 356 
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than tha t in jus t i ce should be done on the basis of a legal 
presumption when ju s t i c e can be done on the basis of f ac t s 
In Hj^  V. EjT , Sir Jooelyne Simon, President of the 
Divorce Division, was prepared to assume that the court had 
power to order a c h i l d ' s btood to be tes ted but would never 
do so when the r e s u l t might be against the c h i l d ' s i n t e r e s t . 
7 
The turning point came in Re. L. , where the issue of paternity 
.arose on the question of the custody of the child on dissolut ion 
of the marr iage. The husband and the wife and the other man 
a l l consented to t e s t s but the of f ic ia l s o l i c i t o r refused on 
behalf of the c h i l d ' s t e s t i t be bastardized, Omrod J . order 
the t e s t f inding tha t as a High Court Judge he had juried lot ion 
to do so; a judge of the old court of Chancery could have made 
such an order in r e l a t ion to a ward of court and, the judge 
held, t h i s H^d paternal j u r i s d i c t i o n had been conferred by 
Q 
s t a t u t e on every High Court Judge the court of appeal upheld 
the order . Lord Denning asserted the j u r i s d i c t i o n in any case 
where pa te rn i ty was in issue and the c h i l d ' s i n t e r e s t would 
be served. 
Q 
In B.R.B. V. J.B. , the court of appeal laid down that 
any Judge of the High Court has power in any proceedings order 
6. (1966) 3 All.E.R. 560. 
7. (1967) 2 All.E.R. 1110. 
8. (1968) 1 All.E.R. 20. 
9. (1968) 2 All.E.R. 1023-
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a blood t e s t s on a chi ld if i t i s in the c h i l d ' s i n t e r e s t . So 
as the law stand no court can compell an adult to be teated 
(blood t e s t evidence) , but the High Court may order a child to 
t e s t where i t s in his or her i n t e r e s t . The l ine between 
adu l t and child for th is purpose s t i l l to be au thor i t a t ive ly 
drawn. The Law Commission published the i r proposal for reform 
in which they expressed t h e i r view that despite these Important 
developments, the law does not go enough and needs be put on a 
more secure l e g i s l a t i v e foo t ing . They propose, i n t e r a l i a -
1 . tha t the presumption of legitimacy should be rebuttable 
by proof on a balance of p r o b a b i l i t i e s , 
2 . tha t any c i v i l court before which the question of paterni ty 
a r i s e s should have the power to d i rec t a blood t e s t of the 
p a r t i e s , including the child and i t s mother; 
3 . tha t a person refusing to be so tes ted s h a l l not be forced 
t o , but the court may draw any inference i t thinks appro-
p r i a t e from the r e fusa l ; 
4 . tha t the age of consent to a t e s t sha l l be 16. 
The Family Law Reform B i l l embodying these and other 
proposa ls , was introduced in the House of Lords on October 31, 
1968. 
In 1969 two cases were considered by the court of appeal, 
11 
they are B ^ v . B and E and W^  v. \h/^ The former was custody 
10. Law Commission No, 16 October 1968. 
1 J. (1969) 3 Al l . E.R. 1106. 
12. (1969) 119 New L.J . IO44. 
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dispute in r e l a t i on to a child born during a f i r s t marriage. 
The wife had remarried, and alleged tha t her second husband 
was the c h i l d ' s f a t h e r . I n i t i a l l y , a l l three adults agreed to 
have t h e i r blood t e s t e d . But a f t e r the o f f i c i a l s o l i c i t o r had 
been to represent the ch i ld , the f i r s t husband consent on 
behalf of the ch i ld . Baker J . at f i r s t instance ordered the 
c h i l d ' s blood to be t e s t e d . 
In i i i V. i£_j_ a husband sought to have ordered.to establ ish 
her adu l t e ry . Here husband and wife were wil l ing to be tested 
and for the child to be tes ted , but the alleged adu l te re r could 
no longer be t raced . The of f ic ia l s o l i c i t o r refused to consent 
on behalf of the ch i ld , and his refusa l was upheld by Simon P. 
The court of appeal unanimously allowed the f i r s t husband's 
appeal in the former case ; and, Lord Denning M.R. d issent ing , 
dissolved the husband's appeal in the l a t t e r . Thus, in neither 
13 case was the court prepared to allow the t e s t . 
14 
I t seems than that as the law stands af ter ^ v. B. & £. 
tha t cour t s , when exercising thei r inherent powers to order 
blood t e s t s , wi l l refuse i t which may prejudice the custody 
r i g h t s of a fa ther who i s relying a presumption of legitimacy. 
Section 20 of P a r t - I l l of the Family Law Reform Act, 1969 
confirms the power of the court to require the use of blood 
t e a t s , however, i t r e t a i n s the courts discreat ionary powers to 
refuse to make an order. Only if an appl ica t ion has been ^ranted 
13. Blood tes t evidence by Collen Tapper, Modern Law Review, 
V. 33, Mar. 1970. 
U . (1959) 3 All .E.R. 1106. 
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1R 
can the p r o v i s i o n s of Sec t ion 23(2) be invoked. 
In S. v» Mac t h e r e i s no guidance in i t as to the 
p r i n c i p l e s which the c o u r t s are to adopt in these c i rcumstances . 
The could w i l l no doubt apply the same p r i n c i p l e s a f t e r the Act 
1fi 
as we now apply before i t . 
Sec t ion 23(2) of the Family Law Reform Act, 1969 s t a t e s : 
"Where in any proceed ings in which the p a t e r n i t y of any person 
f a l l s to be determined by the Court h e a r i n g the proceedings 
t h e r e i s a presumption of law t h a t t h a t person i s l e g i t i m a t e , 
than if -
( a ) a d i r e c t i o n i s given under Sec t ion 20 of t h i s Act in 
those p roceed ings , and 
(b) any p a r t y who i s c la iming any r e l i e f in the proceedings 
and who for the purpose of o b t a i n i n g t h a t r e l i e f i s 
e n t i t l e d to r e l y on the presumption f a i l s to take any 
s t e p requ i red to him f o r the purpose of g iv ing e f f e c t 
to the d i r e c t i o n , t he cour t may adjourn the hear ing for 
such period as i t t h i n k s f i t to enable tha t pa r ty to 
take t ha t s t e p , and if a t the end of t h a t period he has 
f a i l e d wi thout r ea sonab l e cause to t ake i t the oourt may, 
wi thout p r e j u d i c e to Sub-sec t ion (1) of t h i s Sec t ion , 
d ismiss h i s c la im for r e l i e f no twi ths tand ing the absence 
1 7 
of evidence t o rebut the presumpt ion" . ' 
15. The Law Q u a r t e r l y Review, Vol. 87, Jan . 1971. 
16. Lord Denning M.R. in S. v . Mec. & M. (1970) 1 A11.£.R. 
1162, 1164. 
17. Use of blood t e s t s in p u r s u i t of t r u t h by Mary Heyes -
The Law Q u a r t e r l y Review, Vol. 87 , Jan . 1971. 
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Section 20(1) provides that the court 'may' give d i rec -
t i o n for the use of blood t e a t s . I do not think that can 
possibly be intended to confer an unfettered d iscre t ion on 
these courts . . . . the Act gives no guidanoe as to the circums-
tances in which blood t e s t s should be ordered, and I think that 
t h i s must mean t h a t superior courts are to s e t t l e principles in 
so fa r as i t is necessary to d i s turb ex is t ing law in order to 
comply with that Act, and the rea f t e r the lower courts are to 
18 
apply those p r inc ip l e s to cases which come before them." 
1 Q In W^  V. Official So l i c i t o r , the husband had obtained 
a decree n i s i on the ground of wife ' s adultery with a named 
co-respondant, a coloured man. However, the coloured man 
disappeared before the divorce pe t i t i on was heard. This 
meant that a blood tes t might well have shown tha t the husband 
was not the c h i l d ' s f a the r , but would not have given the child 
any indica t ion of the iden t i t y of his f a t h e r . For th is 
reason the t r i a l judge and the court of appeal . Lord Denning 
M.R. d i ssen t ing , refused to order that the child be tes ted . 
Contrary in S_^  v . S^ , the husband had been granted a divorce 
on the grounds of his wi fe ' s adultery with the co-respondant. 
The wife had applied to the Magistrate for an a f f i l i a t i o n order 
against the co-respondant, and her app l ica t ion had been 
adjourned pending the t r i a l of the legitimacy issue . In these 
circumstances i t was held r igh t by the t r i a l judge and the 
18. S^ V. _Si (1970) 3 All .E.R. 107, I I 3 . 
19. (1970) 3 All.E.R. 107. 
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court of appeal, Sachs L . J . d issent ing, to order that a blood 
t e s t be taken as I t could help to e s tab l i sh which of two 
i d e n t i f i a b l e men was f a the r of the c h i l d . 
These decisions were consistence with e a r l i e r case law, 
but the House of Lords refused to countenance such a d i s t inc t ion 
i t was of the opinion t h a t while the court must protect the 
i n t e r e s t of the child i t was en t i t l ed to look at a l l the 
evidences avai lable including tha t of a blood t e s t , and i t 
need not be sa t i s f i ed when ordering a t e s t that the infant 
would be benefi t ted from i t s outcome. 
"But here there i s or may be a conf l ic t between the 
i n t e r e s t s of the child and the general requirement of the 
j u s t i c e . Jus t ice requi res tha t avai lable evidence should not 
be suppressed but i t may be against the i n t e r e s t of the child 
?0 to produce i t " . 
" . . . . the question whether the High Court should exercise 
i t s d i s c r e t i o n in favour of ordering the blood tes t ing of a child 
l i e s outside the custodial j u r i sd i c t i on and within what I have 
termed the protective and anoil l iary durlsdiotlon of the court 
. . . . if what I have cal led the a n c i l l l a r y ju r i sd i c t ion - the 
inherent j u r i s d i c t i o n of the High Court to provide in i t s d iscre-
t i on for a f a i r and sa t i s fac tory t r i a l - were to give place to 
the suppression for the benefit of the infant of a means of 
20 . Per Lord Raid (1970) 3 All .E.R. 10?, 112. 
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f inding the t r u t h , the confl ic t between the I n t e r e s t s of .luatice 
and the advantage of the infact would become too acute to be 
t o l e r a b l e " (emphasis). Consequently, the decision of the court 
of appeal in S^ v . S^ was affirmed in that of W^  v. Official 
S o l i c i t o r was reversed by the unanimous judgment of the house. 
I t i s , therefore, no longer tenable to asser t t h a t a blood t e s t 
w i l l be refused merely because there is only one ident i f iab le 
f a t h e r , should considerat ions of j u s t i c e d ic ta te otherwise. 
In each of these cases the ult imate objective was to determine 
who should bear r e spons ib i l i t y for the ch i ld ' s maintenance, 
j u s t i c e demanded t h a t only the t rue fa ther should be required 
to support the ch i ld . 
In S_^  V. _S^  i t was suggested that they did not have th i s 
type of act ion in mind when they decided that in pa te rn i ty 
d i spute the i n t e r e s t of the child are best served, if the truth 
i s ascer ta ined . Lord Mac Dermatt was the only member of the 
house to touch upon th is specif ic issue when he came to consider 
the High Court 's j u r i s d i c t i o n and observed :-
"And again, if the court had reason to believe that the 
app l i ca t ion for a blood t e s t was of a f ishing nature designed 
fo r some u l t e r i o r motive to ca l l in question the legitimacy, 
otherwise unimpeached, of a child who had enjoyed legit imate 
s t a t u s , i t may well be that the court , act ing under i t s protec-
t ion ra the r than i t s anc i l l i a ry j u r i s d i c t i o n , would be jus t i f ied 
2 1 . Per Lord Mac Dermatt (1970) 3 A l l .E . ^ . 10?, 11? and 118. 
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22 
in r e fus ing the a p p l i c a t i o n " . -
Lord Reid, in h is sepa ra te op in ion , has formulated the 
f o l l o w i n g p r i n c i p l e -
" I t h ink t h a t t h e f i n a l a b o l i t i o n of the old s t rong 
presumpt ion of l eg i t imacy by Sec t ion 26 of the 1969 Act shows 
t h a t in the view of the Par l i ament , p u b l i c pol icy no longer 
r e q u i r e s t h a t s p e c i a l p r o t e c t i o n should be given by the law 
to the s t a t u s of l e g i t i m a c y " . 
In S_^  V. S_^  , Lord^Denning^ M.R. "put forward the 
p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t t r u t h must o u t , and, indeed, t h a t t r u t h should 
24 ou t r u a t coelum". 
In W^ V. O f f i c i a l S o l i c i t o r , i t i s said : 
"In ray o p i n i o n , when a cour t i s asked to decide a p a t e r n i t y 
i s s u e , i t i s in the b e s t i n t e r e s t s of everyone t h a t i t should do 
i t on the b e s t evidence a v a i l a b l e , ^he i s sue of such importance 
a f f e c t s so many people t h a t i t should be decided on a l l evidences 
and not half of i t " . ^ ^ 
In Sj_ v . _S_^  , the House of Lords held t h a t in exe rc i s i ng 
i trs j u r i s d i c t i o n to make a d i r e c t i o n for a blood t e s t on a c h i l d , 
the c h i l d ' s i n t e r e s t were not the so l e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s : '^ i l le 
the court must p r o t e c t the I n t e r e s t s of the c h i l d , i t must a l s o 
22. (1970) 3 All.E.R. 107, 115. 
23. (1970) 3 All.E.R. 107, 111. 
24. 2i v._S^ Sub non. _S^  v. Mec. & M. (1970) 1 All .E.R. 1162,1166 
25. (1970) 1 All.E.R. 1157,1159. 
26 . _S^ V. S. (1972) A.C. 24. 
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take into account the public i n t e r e s t that evidence should not 
be suppressed and tha t the t ruth should be known. 
The decis ion of the Inner House of the Court of Ses-ion 
in Dochert.y v. Mc Gl.ynn,^'^ i t vas held that the husband's prima 
fac ie r igh t to consent to permit c h i l d ' s blood t e s t , were not; 
suspended merely because his pa tern i ty was challenged by a third 
par ty : unless and u n t i l the presumption pater es t was 
r e b u t t e d , the presumptive f a t h e r ' s " l ega l r ights and powers 
e x i s t unaffected, in the exercise of t h a t protective power 
which the court of session possesses to intervene when the 
i n t e r e s t s of j u s t i c e or of pupil concerned may require and 
warrant such in te rven t ion . In fac t in th i s (Docherty oofjei, 
the court placed re l iance on the English case of S^ v. _o^  
(1972) A.C. 24. 
PABT-B : AMERICAH SYSTEM 
For the f i r s t time, in the his tory of Supreme Court of 
United S ta tes , the p e t i t i o n e r challenged the cons t i tu t iona l 
v a l i d i t y of compulsory blood t e s t s in Schembet v. State of 
Ca l i fo rn ia . The p e t i t i o n e r had been convicted in a California 
Court of driving an automobile while under the influence of 
in tox ica t ing l iquor . In the hosp i t a l , to which he had been 
taken a f te r the accidence in which he had been involved, a 
2 7 . Docherty v . Mc. Glynn, 1933, S.L.T. 645. 
2 8 . (1966) 16 L. ed . 2d 908. 
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blood sample v/aa taken by a physician, a t the request of a 
Police Officer, although the p e t i t i o n e r had refused, on the 
advise of his Counsel, to consent to the t e s t . The analysis 
of t h i s sample indicated tha t he had been in toxica ted . I t 
vas admitted in evidence at the t r i a l . The p e t i t i o n e r appealed 
to the Supreme Court of the United Sta tes af ter the appellate 
department of the California Superior Court had affirmed the 
convic t ion . His appeal was based on three grounds -
(a) The f i r s t \vas tha t a compulsory blood t e s t violated 
Amendment XIV of the Const i tut ion which provides in 
part that "not sha l l any s ta te deprive any person of 
l i f e , l iber ty or property, without due process of 
law;" 
(b) That i t v iolated Amendment V which provides tha t no 
person'tehall be compelled in any criminal case to be 
a witness against himself", and 
(c) That i t v io la ted Amendment IV which p ro tec t s the people 
"against unreasonable searches and se i zu re" . 
In the previous of Breivthaupt v. AbraS,^ the Supreme 
Court had held that the ext rac t ion of a sample of blood while 
the Driver was unconscious did not v io la te the due process 
c l o s e . The majority of the Supreme Court speaking in an 
opinion delivered by Brennan J . , said : "We hold tha t the 
p r iv i l ege p ro tec t s an accused only from being compelled to 
t e s t i f y against himself, or otherwise provide the s t a te with 
? 9 . 352 U.S. 432. 
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evidence of a tes t imonia l or communative na ture , and the with-
drawal of blood, and use of the analysis in quest ion, in thla 
case did not involve compulsions to these ends". I t was true 
t h a t the compulsion had been used against the pe t i t i one r to 
obtain the sample, but th i s did not mean tha t the peti t ioner 
was compelled to be a witness against himself. In another case 
Holt V. United States'^, where the accused was forced to put on 
a blouse to determine whether i t f i t t e d him. Mr. Just ice Holmes, 
speaking for the court said : The p roh ib i t ion of compelling a 
man in criminal case to be a witness agains t himself i s a prohi-
b i t i o n of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort 
communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as 
evidence when i t may be mater ia l . The objection in pr inciple 
would forbid a jury to look at pr isoner and compare his features 
with a photograph in proof". 
I t has a lso been held in other cases both by federal 
and s t a t e s courts tha t the taking of f inge r -p r in t s did not 
c o n s t i t u t e a breach of f i f th amendment. The court in the instant 
case, however, seemed to fee l that the l i e detector t e s t s , which 
measures bodily reac t ions during in t e r roga t ion , might v io la te 
the s p i r i t and history of pr ivi lege against incriminat ion. I t 
may be suggested that such t e s t s should be rejected on the 
ground of t h e i r uncertainty rather than on the ground of self 
incr imina t ion . If the r e s u l t they gave was conclusive i t would 
^ 0 . 218 U.S. 245 
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seem unreasonable to reject them. At one time it was regarded 
as legitimate to use as evidence the reactions that a person 
suspected of murder showed when brought into the presence of 
the corpse, but it was realised in time that such evidence was 
completely unreliable as proof that the accused person had 
committed the murder. It was argued in one case that the refusal 
of the accused person to be confronted in such a way was tenta-
mount to a confession on his part, but, here again there might 
be other rational reasons why the accused person refused to 
•2-1 
submit to such a test."^  On the other hand in the case of 
blood tests no action on the part of the accused is required 
32 
the test will be the same whether he is conscious or unconscious. 
The next objection to a compulsory blood test, based on 
the ground that it is in violation of the IVth Amendment prohi-
biting unlawful search and seizure is strong one. In Wolf v. 
33 Colorado. the court said that : "the security of ones privacy 
against arbitrary intrusion by the police is at the core of the 
IVth Amendment and basic to a free society". In the present 
case the court did not dispute the argument that taking a blood 
test constituted a search of person, but it is held that all 
such searches are not forbidden. The privilege apply only to 
those that are unreasonable in the circumstances. The early 
cases suggested that there was an unrestricted right for a 
31. Counselman v. Hitchcock. 142 U.S. 547, 562. 
32. Compulsory Blood test as evidence : The Law Quarterly 
Review, Vol. 83, January 1967 
33. 338 U.S. 25. 
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Police Officer to search the person of an accused person. When 
legal ly a r r e s t ed , to discover and seize f r u i t s , or evidence of 
crime. 
In the present case, however, the court f e l t that these 
statements might be too wide, and t h a t , a blood t e s t could not be 
taken with a search warrant unless there was a danger that the 
evidence might disappear. 
Harlan J . and Stewart J . concurred adding that "The case 
in no way implicates the f i f t h Amendment". 
PART-C : INDIAW LAV 
In Ind ia -
- When proper consent i s obtained 
Inferences can be drawn from a refusa l to give 
/ consent 
j ^ - Power of the court to order blood t e s t s without 
consent 
Const i tu t ional Provisions 
Statutory Provisions 
- Jud i c i a l View-point 
The blood t e s t s are very important in a s s i s t i ng the court 
to determine the question of f a c t . As already has been discussed 
in the previous chapters blood t e s t s are indispensible in various 
types of cr iminal inves t iga t ions , criminal proceedings, c iv i l 
proceedings and are pa r t i cu l a r ly important in the cases where a 
child 's pa te rn i ty is in i s sue , whether in legit imacy, a f f i l i a t i o n 
proceedings or divorce proceedings on the ground of adultery. 
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I t i s c l e a r t ha t the cour t can order blood t e s t s if a l l 
parti'~-3 concerned, a re consented t o submit themselves for the 
same. The need of lav/ is t h e r e where the pa r ty or p a r t i e s to 
t h e proceeding a re decl ined to consen t . Lacking l e g i s l a t i o n the 
c o u r t do not f ind i t easy t o f i t blood t e s t evidence Into the 
e x i s t i n g l e g a l framework. What course can be taken if the 
p a r t i e s to the proceeding r e f u s e s consent to a blood t e s t ? I t 
i s with t h i s problem t h a t the p r e s e n t chap te r i s mainly concerne 
i ) whether a sample of blood and if t h i s i s done without 
consent or o ther lawful a u t h o r i t y the t ak ing of blood 
34 
w i l l be a t r e s s p a s s to the pe r son , 
i i ) whther the proper consent i s ob t a ined . 
There can be no q u e s t i o n of proceedings a g a i n s t the person p e r -
forming the t e s t , if the person upon whom the t e s t i s to be made 
i s an adu l t and of sound mind. The problem i s presented when 
the s u b j e c t i s incompetent to give c o n s e n t . Capacity to consent 
in t h i s r e s p e c t i s a deba t ab l e p o i n t . On the one hand i t looks 
almost t o be a mat ter where the law should a t t a ch the same inca-
p a c i t i e s , as fo r the law of c o n t r a c t and f ix the age of co-nv.ent 
a t twenty-one . On the o ther hand very young c h i l d r e n a re a t l e 
to g ive evidence provided they understand the importance of 
t e l l i n g the t r u t h . The ques t ion r e g a r d i n g i n f a n t s i s the meaninp 
of the word ' g u a r d i a n ' . Guardianship i s somewhat a complex 
s u b j e c t and family law tex t -books should be consu l ted for 
3 4 . L a t t e r v . Baraddel (1881) 50 L . J . Q . B . 448. 
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detail rules. 
I n f e r e n c e s can be drawn from a r e f u s a l to give consen t . 
In H_^  V. _Sj^  the wife of a sample of blood from the c h i l d . It 
can be exp la ined t o her t h a t if she i s in f a c t innocent of 
a d u l t e r y the blood t e s t in no way harm her c a s e . Only i:f a he 
i s g u i l t y i s t he re a chance t h a t the blood t e n t w i l l bo a^^ainst 
h e r . Would i t not be a n a t u r a l inference from t h i s t h a t nbo had 
something t o hid if she than refused to give consent? Of course , 
i f she could show t h a t she had s t r o n g r e l i g i o u s ob jec t ions to 
t h e blood t e s t , t h i s inference could not be drawn. In add i t ion 
t h e r e would be o t h e r cases where the inference could not be 
drawn, e . g . , where in an a d u l t e r y case the ch i ld i s old enough 
hisTiself to re fuse consen t , no i n f e r ence could be drawn agjiinst 
t he w i f e . Allowing f o r these c a s e s , t h e r e w i l l be occas iona l ly 
c i rcumstances in which as a mat te r of common sense , an inference 
35 
can be inade. 
Under Sec t ion 114 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872, court 
may presume e x i s t e n c e of c e r t a i n f a c t s , i l l u s t r a t i o n (g) s t a t e 
t h a t the cour t may presume -
(g) t h a t evidence which could be and i s not produced 
would, if produced, be unfavourable t o the person who withhoId,>3 
i t . 
The person wi th -ho ld the evidence in the form of blood 
in h i s body, which he can produced fo r the purpose of comparison 
3 5 . Medicine Science and the Law, Vo l .6 , Nov. 6 , 1966, 
Blood Tests and the Law by David Lanham. 
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and if he refuse to submit for blood t e s t than on the basis 
of the analogy from the above stated provisions the court may 
draw an unfavourable inference under the Family Law Reform 
Act, 1969, in England. Section 20 provides that in any c iv i l 
proceeding in which paterni ty of any person f a l l s to be deter-
mined by the court , i t may give a d i r ec t ion for the use of 
blood t e s t s to a sce r t a in whether such t e s t show that a party 
to the proceedings is or is not thereby excluded from being 
the fa the r of that person. If a person f a i l s to comply with 
i n s t ruc t ions of the court to provide a blood sample, the court 
may draw such inference from th i s fact as appears proper in the 
circumstances (S. 23). 
There are than the blood tes t (evidence of pa tern i ty) 
Regulation Act, 1971, which provide i n t e r a l i a that where tho 
person having the care and control of a disabled subject, docs 
not consent to the taking of a sample, he may record on the 
d i r ec t ion his reason and there can be no compulsion in thin 
behalf. No such specif ic s t a tu to ry provision exis t in our 
country. However, in an appropriate case presumption i s avai-
lable under S. 114 of the Evidence Act. 
Const i tu t ional Provisions 
-^ Ar t i c l e 20(3) of the Consti tution of India enacts that 
no person accused of any offence shal l be compelled to be a 
witness against himself. 
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The present clause (3) of Ar t ic le 20 follows the 
language of the Vth Amendment of the American Const i tut ion. 
Three things are necessary to cons t i tu te the requirements of 
t h i s clause viz -
i ) an accused person, 
i i ) his being compelled to be a -witness, and 
i i i ) such compulsion being against himself. In other 
words the proh ib i t ion operates only when an accused 
i s sought to be forced to depose against h is 
innocence. 
The pe rmiss ib i l i t y of iden t i f i ca t ion by f inger , palm 
and f o o t - p r i n t s and the taking of accused's picture af te r 
a r r e s t , blood and urine t e s t a , use of emetic stomach pump or 
s imi la r device for ex t rac t ing ornaments swallowed e t c . , re(3uir~ 
ing suspect or accused to wear or t rying on pa r t i cu la r apparel 
or requi r ing defendant in criminal case to exhibit himaolf or 
perform physical act during t r i a l and in presence of Jury do 
not offend the due process clause. 
Self incrimination can only mean conveying information 
based upon personal knowledge of the person giving information 
and cannot include merely the mechanical process of producln/'; 
documents in court which may throw l i g h t on any point in con-
t rovercy , but which do not contain any statement of the accused 
based on his personal knov/ledge. Thus, when a person gives his 
36. Annotonation 64 ALR 1089 and 31 ALE 204; Shaffer v. 
United States (I904) 49 LAWed. 361; Novak v. l3t. of 
Columbia 49 A. 2d. 88 . 
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f i n g e r impress ion or specimen w r i t i n g or s i g n a t u r e , though i t 
may amount to f u r n i s h i n g evidence in the l a r g e sense i s not 
inc luded wi th in the express ion " to be a w i t n e s s " . In theae 
c a s e s he i s not g i v i n g any pe r sona l t e s t imony . They are merely 
m a t e r i a l s for comparison. Hence these t h i n g s would not come 
w i t h i n the p r o h i b i t i o n of A r t i c l e 20(3).^ '^ What i s forbidden 
under A r t i c l e 20(3) i s to compel a person to say something from 
h i s pe rsona l knowledge r e l a t i n g t o charge a g a i n s t him. V/hen 
we draw the analogy from these d e c i s i o n s by the American 
Cour t s and the Indian Supreme Court we come t o the conclusion 
t h a t compulsory order fo r t e s t does not offend the Ar t i c l e 
2 0 ( 3 ) of the C o n s t i t u t i o n of I n d i a . 
38 In P. Venkataswaralu v . P . SubbaVva, , the defendant 
a p p l i e s under S e c t i o n 151, C.P.C. f o r a d i r e c t i o n from the 
Court to the p l a i n t i f f h i s mother, and h i s next f r i e n d , to 
appear in person before the cour t t o enable medical expert to 
t ake samples of t h e i r b lood . The lea rned Judge ordered to 
appear before the Court f o r blood t e s t , bu t the High Court 
r e v e r s e d the o rde r , and s a id -
"Sec t ion 151 has been introduced i n t o the Code to give 
e f f e c t to the inhe ren t powers of c o u r t s . Such powers can only 
be e x e r c i s e d ex deb i to j u s t i c e and not on t h e mere invoca t ion 
3 7 . S t a t e of Bombay v . Kathi Kalu, AIR 1961 SC 1308 
3 8 . A . I . R . (38) 1951 Madras 910 ( 1 ) . 
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of p a r t i e s or on mere v o l i t i o n of cour t s . Thus, where the 
defendant applies for the d i rec t ion from the court to the 
p l a i n t i f f a minor ch i l d , and his mother, h is next f r iend, to 
appear in person before the court to enable a medical expert 
to take sample of t he i r blood and the p l a in t i f f his mother are 
unv/illing to offer t he i r blood for the t e s t to recognise the 
p a t e r n i t y of the ch i ld , there is no procedure e i ther in c i v i l 
procedure code or the evidence act v/hlch empowers the court 
to force them to do so . " 
39 Suba.v.ya Gounder v . Bhoopala Subramanium, case there is 
no specia l s t a tu te and there is no provision either in Gr.P.C. 
or in Evidence Act empowering courts to d i r ec t such a t e s t to 
be made. Similar ly, there is no procedure e i the r in C.P.C. or 
Evidence Act which provides for a blood t e s t being made of a 
minor and his mother when the father i s disputing the legitimacy 
of the minor and hold that if the pa r t i e s are unwilling to 
submit to such a t e s t the court has no power to di rect them to 
submit themselves to such a t e s t (Para 7 ) . 
Art ic le 20(5) enacts (Para 8 ) . Bearing these 
p r i n c i p l e s in mind provisions of C . P . C , C r . P . C , Evidence Act 
and provision of Ar t i c l e 20(3), the compulsory d i rec t ion by the 
Magistrate in a proceeding ( c i v i l or quasi c i v i l ) to the defen-
dant to give his blood for blood t e s t being made cannot be 
39. A. I .E . 1959 Madras 396. 
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supported. 
"There i s hardly any provision of law whether in Code 
of Civi l Procedure, Indian Evidence Act, or elsewhere under 
which an appl icat ion can be made or granted compelling a party 
to submit to blood t e s t or which compells a person to give a 
sample of his blood for analysis of blood grouping t ea t or 
even. Warrants adverse inference to be drawn against him if 
4-0 he refuses to give such sample'l 
In Nishit Kumar Biswas v . An.jali Biswas, application 
and counter appl ica t ion were made requir ing the cour t ' s d i rec-
t i o n for the blood t e s t and accept the repor t , thereby as the 
way of addi t ional evidence. On e i t h e r version I remain on 
the same opinion tha t in such cases the court should not 
author ise any interference l ike taking of blood from any 
pe r son ' s body, more so when i t could not extend to establish 
the s c i e n t i f i c impossibi l i ty of husband being the father of 
the ch i ld . These would be nothing to prevent such cases 
becoming the b a t t l e group of experts with bloody hands. The 
voluntary donation of blood for t e s t i ng and the courts drawin;^, 
of presumptions on proper miaterials in appropriate cases la 
however, i s a d i f ferent matter . 
40 . F i e l d ' s Law of Evidence, Vol.V, 10th e d . , 1972, p.4908 
4 1 . A.I.R. 1968, Gal. 105 (Para 13). 
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In Lokamma v . Sundara SaPalya, while dealing with 
Section 401 read with Section 397 and also with Section 482, 
G r . P . C , the court d i rec ted the Magistrate to have the 
p e t i t i o n e r (chi ld) and the respondant ( fa ther ) examined for 
blood grouping t e s t and to submit a report to th i s court . In 
t h i s case f a the r disallowed the paterni ty of the chi ld . On 
the other hand the p a r t i e s agreed to go to the blood t e s t and 
the mother would produce the child for the examination. 
Ju s t i c e D. Noronha observed t h a t , " I t i s an important t e s t and 
would go a long way in the ends of Jus t i ce" . 
43 In Dr .(Smt.) Bharti Ra.1 v . Sumesh Sachdeo, -^  where the 
I p e t i t i o n under Guardian and Wards Act, the D i s t r i c t Judge made 
an interim order on an appl ica t ion of Shri Baldeo Raj for 
comparison of blood of the^child with the blood of the parents 
of both a ides . The order provides, "This ia an appl icat ion by 
the pe t i t ioner for comparison of the blood of the child with 
the blood of the parents on both s i d e s . The counsel for the 
opposite p a r t i e s have objected t h i s appl icat ion on the ground 
t h a t today i s the date fixed for evidence and the pe t i t ioner 
must lead evidence avai lable with him and the court should pass 
s u i t a b l e orders on t h i s appl ica t ion the rea f te r . This appears 
to be proper. The pe t i t i one r sha l l adduce evidence avalluhle 
with him, today and af ter the close of such evidence, sui table 
orders sha l l be passed about the blood t e s t " . 
4 2 . (1976) C r . L . J . 1962 & 1963. 
4 3 . A . I . E . 1986 A l l . 259. 
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B.D. Agarval J . said : "I do not think tha t there waa 
anything wrong on the part of the D i s t r i c t Judge cal l ing upon 
the pe t i t i one r f i r s t to produce evidence t o afford prima faeie 
s a t i s f a c t i o n of the fact tha t the disputed child was born to 
the p e t i t i o n e r ' s wife. I t deserves considerat ion in thin 
context tha t , according to the p e t i t i o n e r , his wife, gave birth 
to a male and female child as twins while respondant 3 gave 
b i r t h to a female chi ld , but as a r e s u l t of collusion between 
the respondant and the hospi ta l a u t h o r i t i e s , the male child 
of the pet i t ionerwas subst i tuted with the female child of 
respondant 3 . According t o D i s t r i c t Judge t h i s fac t was not 
apparent on a bare perusal of the hospi ta l records that the 
respondant<calimed that respondant 3 gave b i r th to a male 
ch i l d , a fact supported by hosp i ta l records . In the context 
of these circumstances i t was a proper exercise of discret ion 
on the par t of the Di s t r i c t Judge to ask the pe t i t i one r to 
produce to afford a t leas t a prima facie s a t i s f ac t i on that 
the story put forward by him has some substance. The order 
passed by the D i s t r i c t Judge, was therefore , a sound order 
and c a l l s for no interference Further, I am in agreement 
with the D i s t r i c t Judge tha t an order should not be passed 
d i r e c t i n g a couple to submit for paterni ty t e s t (of) a child 
in t he i r custody and claimed by them as the i r own child, merely 
because another person suspects tha t the child belongs to him. 
As already pointed out, the D i s t r i c t Judge in t h i s case has 
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ca l led upon the p e t i t i o n e r to f i r s t adduce prima facie evidonce, 
but that evidence has not been adduced y e t . The pe t i t ioner can 
not claim r e l i e f (order for blood t e s t ) by th i s wri t p e t i t i o n . 
Ju s t i c e Aggarwal further s t a t ed tha t i t would be hazardous, Ln 
my view, if on a mere expression of doubt t h a t a subjective level , 
the court were to require a child and those claiming to be his 
parents to submit themselves to blood t es t* The dominant factor 
a f t e r a l l i s not the r i gh t s of the warring pa r t i e s but the 
p ro tec t ion of the r i g h t s of a child as a human being. Their 
Lordships of the Supreme Court in Rosy Jacob v. Jackob A. 
Chakramakkal.^^ expressed t h e i r ent i re agreement with Maharajan 
J . (Madras High Court) In his view that in proceedings under 
the Guardian and Wards Act, "the control l ing consideration 
governing the custody of the children is the welfare of the 
chi ldren concerned and not the r ight of t he i r paren ts" . 
45 
In Dr. (r4rs.) Bhar t l Ra.i case, the court exercises pro-
t e c t i v e j u r i s d i c t i o n on behalf of an in fan t . In my considered 
opinion i t would be unjust and not f a i r e i ther to d i rec t a teat 
f o r a c o l l a t e r a l reason to a s s i s t a l i t i g a n t in his or her claim. 
The chi ld cannot be allowed to suffer because of his incapacity; 
the aim is to ensure that he gets his r i g h t s . If in a case, the 
court has reason to believe that the appl ica t ion for blood tectt 
is of a f in i sh ing nature or designed for some u l t e r io r motive. 
44 . (1973) 1 sec B40,(AIR 1973 SC 2090) 
45 . Supra n. 43. 
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I t would be u n j u s t i f i e d in not acceding t o such a p r a y e r . 
I t i s obvious t h a t in a case such as the p re sen t where 
t h e o the r s ide r e l i e s s t r o n g l y on the m a t e r i a l a v a i l a b l e on 
t h e r ecord and the p e t i t i o n e r has d i s p u t e repeated d i r e c t i o n s 
r e f r a i n e d from g iv ing evidence in proof her r i g h t t o the c h i l i , 
t h e r e can be no blood t e s t d i r e c t e d on t h e a u t h o r i t y af oresai ' l 
s i d e - t r a c k i n g the f a c t s and c i rcumstances the reo f . The dec i s ion 
i s not the a u t h o r i t y for the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t the con3id(?rations 
which have impelled in the p re sen t r e f u s a l to accede to the 
p r a y e r of the p e t i t i o n e r , thus f a r a re i r r e l e v a n t or of no 
consequence . 
^" Km. I'lan.lu v . Mohammad Yasin, the ques t ion considej-ed 
was whether Km. I-Ianju a l i a s Shahnaz Begum aged between 6 to 8 
y e a r s had to be given in the custody of Dina Nath dur ing the 
pendency of the t r i a l of Kamla and Smt. Shyampati under Sect ion 
363A the penal code in the exe rc i se of i n h e r e n t powers of t l i i s 
c o u r t . The learned Judge observed t h a t "as i t was not pofi,.nble 
f o r Km. Manju a l i a s Shahnaz Begum t o s t a t e c o r r e c t l y whether 
Dina Nath and Smt. Phoola Devi were p a r e n t s or Mohammad Yaain 
and h i s wife Smt. Noorjahan were her p a r e n t s i t was considered 
neces sa ry t o determine her parentage by the performance of 
blood t e s t . 
A c a r e f u l p e r u s a l shows tha t t h e d i r e c t i o n given fo r the 
blood t e s t proceeded on i t s own f a c t s and t h e r e i s no p r i n c i p l e 
as such l a i d down fo r g e n e r a l a p p l i c a t i o n . 
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C O N C L U S I O N 
Every system of lav? has drawn a d i s t i n c t i o n between 
the legal and soc ia l s t a tu s of a child born of an i l l i c i t 
union and a child who i s an outcome of a val id wedlock. The 
s ta tus of i l l eg i t imacy has expressed through the ages soc ie ty ' s 
condemnation of i r responsible l ia i sons beyond the hands of 
marriage. But condemning an infant for the f a u l t which is 
not even known to him i s i l l o g i c a l and unjus t . No child is 
responsible for his b i r t h , and penalizing the i l l eg i t ima te 
child i s an ineffectual as well as an unjust way of deterring 
er r ing pa ren t s . 
To avoid the soc ia l stigma of i l l eg i t imacy the English 
Law leans heavily in favour of the child born during the 
subaistance of a val id wedlock. Bastardizing the child without 
cl inching proof of i l legi t imacy i s brought with severe disadvan-
tage to the child in p a r t i c u l a r and ev i l consequences to the 
society in gene ra l . To achieve the ^ i d policy the English 
legal system has developed some inbui l t mechanism. F i r s t l y , 
by the s t rong presumption in favour of the legitimacy and 
secondly by the appl ica t ion of maxim leg i t imat io per subsequence 
matriraoniura. The married mothers are protected from being 
dragged to courts of law to defend the i r v i r t ue in su i t s cooked 
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up by the greedy and troubleaome l i t i g a n t r e l a t i v e s . Ifever-
t h e l e s s , while i t ia unjuat and inconaionable to foiat 
pa te rn i ty and i t s attendant r e s p o n a i b i l i t i e s on a man who by 
a l l reasons could not have been the fa ther of the chi ld . 
Hence the law fu l ly p ro tec t s and safeguards the legitimacy, 
i t a lso allow proof of f ac t s which render pa te rn i ty highly 
improbable in a pa r t i cu l a r case . 
Islamic Law which i s a divinely ordained law seeks to 
e s t ab l i sh a j u s t l y balanced society transcending the l imi ta t ion 
of space and t ime. So i t t r i e s to achieve the above goal by 
drawing a fine balance between different i n t e r e s t s . On tho one 
hand i t i s the s p i r i t of the Shariab to do the jus t ice to a l l 
i t s c r e a t i o n , on the other hand i t does not turn a blind eye 
to the i n t e r e s t of an innocent chi ld . I t has evolved i tu 
p r inc ip l e s r e l a t i n g to legitimacy and ges ta t ion with a l l care 
and caut ion. Islamic Law does not allow the society to have 
the i n t e r e s t of a pa r t i cu l a r individual at the cost of the 
t r u t h . I t does not go too far in zeal of pro tec t ing the 
i n t e r e s t of the child the way other man made l ega l systems do. 
English Law is more based on soc ia l policy than truth 
but the Islamic Law due to s t r i c t adherence to the puri ty of 
conception i s solely based on t ruth and legi t imat ion per 
subsequence matrimonium has no place in i t . That i s why the 
Islamic Law allows proof of f ac t s to rebut the presumption of 
legi t imacy. 
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The maximum period of ges ta t ion fixed by the muslira 
j u r i s t s has been c r i t i c i s e d on the ground that they are not 
borne out by modern s c i e n t i f i c knowledge of ges ta t ion and 
pregnancy. This maximum period was a lso subjected to severe 
c r i t i c i sm on the assumption that Islamic Lav protects i l l e g i -
timacy under the cover of legit imacy. But i t waa overlooked 
by these c r i t i c s that t h i s maximum period i s a r e s u l t of mere 
analogy and not of a c lear -cu t injunction of a Qura'nic Ayat. 
Even in modern science no one can say conclusively that the 
child -would be born v/ithin 280 days of the d issolu t ion of 
marr iage. Despite i t s a l l amazing achievements the medical 
science has fa i l ed to cor rec t ly spe l l out the exact period of 
ges t a t ion . Therefore, what our legal doctors did, is nothlnf' 
more than devising a safety valve, to cope with a s i tua t ion 
which due to some bio logica l defects may occur. Hence the 
c r i t i c i s m of Islamic Law of legitimacy is unfounded and there-
f o r e , untenable on th i s count. 
The minimum period of gesta t ion under Islamic Law is six 
months, which is more sound in comparison to the common law 
p r i n c i p l e , which is a lso embodied under Section 112 of the 
Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The Medical testimony would generally 
approve t h i s minimum l imi t s of Muslim Law. 
Again i t is the unique feature of Islamic Law on the 
point which is not found in any other legal systems of the 
world, tha t i t confers the r ight of inheri tance on an i l leg i t imate 
102 
child from i t s mother s i d e . 
The policy of Indiari Lav/ i s to pro tec t the legitimacy of 
the child when he i s r e a l l y a off-spring of legally married 
couple and born during the continuenoe of marriage, i . e . , the 
Indian Law is tr ied to be based on t r u t h . That i s why the 
presumption of legitimacy is allowed to be rebutted by the proof 
of non-access. When the presumption of legitimacy can be 
rebutted by a loose evidence l ike 'non-access ' than the logic 
suggests that a s c i e n t i f i c evidence of pa te rn i ty can very well 
rebut t or corroborate the presumption of legi t imacy. 
The laws dealing with the legal presumption of legitimacy 
and pa te rn i ty in English, Islamic and Indian legal systems are 
laid down in d e t a i l . The in tent ion of l e g i s l a t u r e and the 
demand of the jus t i ce and t ru th is tha t the fa ther of a child 
in law should be the same, who is the b io log ica l father of that 
ch i ld . The presumptions are never f i na l t r u t h s , so every 
presumption howsoever strong i t may be can be rebutted by any 
other more convincing and d i r ec t evidence. The presumption and 
pa te rn i ty can val idly be rebutted or corroborated by the modern 
s c i e n t i f i c techniques spec ia l ly those techniques which are 
beinp developed as branches of science i . e . , pathology, forensic 
and gene t i c s . These developments can very well be used and 
u t i l i z e d to find out more speci f ic and r e l i a b l e conclusion. The 
considerable advancement in the science of blood grouping has 
provided the courts of an improved means of proof of special 
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value, where the question of paternity a r i s e s . The legis la tures 
and courts in England are u t i l i z i n g and f i t t i n g such evidence 
i n t o the ex is t ing lega l framev/ork. The Indian courts have also 
successful ly used such evidences into the appropriate cases of 
p a t e r n i t y . 
The courts in Soviet Russia have allowed blood t e s t s since 
1927, and today posi t ive r e s u l t s are regarded as absolutely con-
clus ive proof of a non-paternity. In Sweden blood t e s t s are 
compulsory as rout ine matter in a l l a f f i l i a t i o n cases . It is 
strange that the Indian courts in most of the cases declared that 
the Section 112 of Evidence Act does not allow admission of 
blood tes t evidence, though i t is most objective and foolproof 
evidence. 
The Law Commission in i t s 69th Report considered relevancy 
of blood t e s t s but rejected the suggestion of admitting i t in 
evidence, A careful analysis of decided cases on Section 112 
es tabl i shed the fac t that in majority of the cases the presump-
t i o n can, at p resen t , be rebutted only by proof of ' non-acceb-s' . 
This approach c rea tes anamolies, and the r e s u l t out posi t ion ia 
an a r t i f i c i a l one, pa r t i cu l a r ly in view of s c i e n t i f i c develop-
ments which can now furnish very r e l i ab l e evidence. 
In a recent case Prof. Chandrashekharan said "We tes t 
about ten systems of blood t e s t i n g s " . The deciding ' factor was 
the SlA typing of blood. If a l l these t e s t s were conducted the 
population could be divided in to 300 million groups, i t almost 
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reaches ind iv idua l i sa t ion of blood. In these instances he ;.)aid 
"we can say cent per cent whether a pa r t i cu l a r child is not a 
chi ld of 'X' and 'Y' but we can say 99.9 per cent that the 
chi ld i s born to a person. The a r r iva l of I»IA inpr in t in r is a 
big step towards a forensic s c i e n t i s t ' s goal in t h i s area , "'he 
D.N.A. f inger -pr in t ing has the po t en t i a l to exceed the efficiency 
of conventional systems (blood-group t e s t s ) because these are 
good grounds for an t i c ipa t ing the def in i te ansv/ers not only 
t h o s e , excluding pa te rn i ty but also for pin-pointing the true 
f a t h e r . 
The chronology of jud ic ia l pronouncements i s re f lec t ing 
a systematic p ic ture tha t how the law i s developed by the courts 
in England in t h i s r e spec t . These j u d i c i a l pronouncements ra,ade 
mature the condition which resul ted in the enactment of two 
l e g i s l a t i o n s , one in 1969 the p a r t - I l l of Family Law Reform Act 
and the second in 1971, The Blood Test (Evidence of Patern i ty) 
Regulation Act, 1971. India i s passing through Pre-1969 era ol 
England and the s i t u a t i o n i s matured r a the r i t is demand of time 
and j u s t i c e that England like l e g i s l a t i o n s should also be enacted 
he re , and the English Acts can provide an excellent blue print 
to propose the l e g i s l a t i o n s in our country. 
As i t i s c l ea r from the various jud ic ia l decisions of 
var ious High Courts tha t the Indian cons t i tu t iona l provisions 
are not violated if the courts ordered for the blood t e s t s and 
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even the provisions of Evidence Act and other relevant Acta 
a lso permit the courts if not expressly then impliedly to 
order for the t e s t in the disputed pa te rn i ty cases. But the 
cour t s have not found i t easy to adjust t h i s power into the 
e x i s t i n g l ega l framework and the courts are in want of a 
l e g i s l a t i v e c l a r i t y . The express provisions through the 
l e g i s l a t i o n of granting the power to the courts to order 
compulsory blood t e s t s w i l l make the p ic tu re clear and a l l 
ambigui t ies w i l l come t o an end. 
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